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Neither ‘Public’ Nor ‘Private’, ‘National’ nor ‘International’: 
Transnational Corporate Governance from a Legal Pluralist 
Perspective 
ABSTRACT 
The following paper is part of a multi-year research project that investigates the emer-
gence of a transnational corporate governance regime as a key example of the transfor-
mation of state-based regulation. This example received an extensive treatment in the 
context of a monographical study co-authored with Gralf-Peter Calliess (University of 
Bremen, and Director, Collaborative Research Centre 597 ‘Transformation of the State’, 
Program on ‘Legal Certainty on Global Markets’). The monograph was published in 
May 2010 with Hart Publishing under the title: Rough Consensus and Running Code: A 
Theory of Transnational Private Law. The growing significance of expert committees 
mandated or self-empowered to draft binding norms for market participants in a wide 
range of fields illustrates the decentring of norm creation and rule-making in the ‚post-
regulatory state’ of the early 21st century. The paper also contributes to a larger research 
project on transnational private regulation, carried out under the auspices of Hague In-
stitute for the Internationalisation of Law [HiiL] at University College Dublin, the 
European University Institute and Tilburg University. It addresses the regulatory chal-
lenges arising from a fast-growing body of norms produced by non-state actors in the 
transnational arena. Focusing on the example of corporate governance codes through a 
legal pluralist lens, the paper investigates the arguments that qualify corporate govern-
ance codes as either ‘soft’ law or as non-law and rejects this categorization with refer-
ence to the wide-ranging evidence of new forms of regulatory governance both within 
and outside of the nation-state. The creation of corporate governance codes is seen as 
example of indirect regulation in politically sensible regulatory areas, where state law 
makers engage in forms of collaborative norm creation for example in the form of pri-
vate code drafting and subsequent public endorsement. In the case of the German corpo-
rate governance code, however, the drafting of the Code occurred in a non-exclusively 
private sphere, which raises important questions as to the adequacy of the public-private 
distinction with regard to the assessment of the existence or the lack of legitimacy of 
contemporary norm-making processes. This paper was first presented at the Inaugural 
International Programme Conference of the HiiL Project at University College Dublin 
on 16 June 2010. 
 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 128) 
 
CONTENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 
B. MARKETS AND STATES AS REFERENCE POINTS IN THE REGULATION DEBATE.................3 
I. The ‘Death of the State by Globalisation’-Thesis ....................................................... 3 
II. Markets And Their Global Disembeddedness................................................................ 6 
1. Society as an Adjunct to the Market.............................................................................. 6 
2. The Exaggerated News of the Death of the State .......................................................... 8 
C. TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PLURALISM..............................................................12 
I. The Ambivalence of Global Governance .................................................................. 12 
II. The Emergence of Transnational Regulatory Landscapes ........................................ 14 
D. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES ...............................................................................19 
I. What is Corporate Governance?................................................................................ 20 
II. The Financialization of the Economy and Global Corporate  Regulatory Reform ... 24 
III. Law Making in Corporate Governance: The Example of the German Corporate 
Governance Code ...................................................................................................... 29 
1. Who – Really – Makes Company Law?..................................................................... 34 
2. Corporate Law Making Between State and Society................................................... 38 
IV. Corporate Governance and the Intricacies of Rough Consensus and Running 
Code .......................................................................................................................... 39 
E. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................45 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ........................................................................................................48 
 
 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 128) 
- 1 - 
Neither ‘Public’ Nor ‘Private’, ‘National’ nor ‘International’: 
Transnational Corporate Governance from a Legal Pluralist 
Perspective1 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Much of today’s writing on ‘global governance’ presumes a fundamental gap between 
the domestic forms, institutions and instruments of legal regulation on the one hand and 
what is perceived as a dramatic regulatory void on the global scale on the other. This 
anxiety is particularly accentuated with regard to border-crossing, global corporate acti-
vity, which is seen as having over time successfully escaped the reach of traditional, 
nation state-based forms of regulation. As the literature on the challenges of regulating 
the conduct of multinational business corporations [MNCs] has been growing exponen-
tially, the contention remains, however, whether or not an answer to this alleged ex-
haustion of the regulatory state in the fact of global corporate (mis-)conduct is likely to 
be found in the extension of the regulatory grasp of the nation state – or of international 
state bodies – in a kind of ‘expanded jurisdiction’ sense. By contrast, what appears to 
emerge from a continuing, rich assessment by lawyers2, political scientists3 and econo-
mists4 with the corporate, labour law and human rights dimensions of MNC is a gro-
wing awareness of the need to approach the problem from what has fruitfully been re-
                                                 
1  I am grateful for comments from Fabrizio Cafaggi, Martin Böhmer, and Jacco Bomhoff and the par-
ticipants of the Transnational Private Regulation Conference in Dublin, June 2010. Financial assis-
tance from the Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law and from the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada [Grant # 864-2007-0265] is gratefully acknowledged. This 
paper was completed during a research stay at the Collaborative Research Centre 597 ‘Transforma-
tions of the State’ at the University of Bremen and the Hanse Institute of Advanced Study, Delmen-
horst, Germany, June 2010. 
2  Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2007); see already 
Detlev F. Vagts, 'The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law' (1969) 83 Harvard Law 
Review 739. 
3  John Ruggie, 'Business and Human Rights: Further steps toward the operationalization of the “protect, respect 
and remedy” framework. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises' (2010) A/HRC/14/27 
http://baseswiki.org/w/images/en/0/04/2010_Advance_Edited_Report.pdf. 
4  John H. Dunning and Sarianna M. Lundan, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, 2nd ed. (Edward 
Elgar, 2008). 
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ferred to as a ‘regulatory governance’ perspective.5 From this vantage point the challen-
ge presents itself no longer as one of law’s limits (or as the ‘end of the state’), but as 
one, which is foremost concerned with the way in which law operates, is created and 
enforced in the global arena. And from this perspective, then, we can begin to take into 
view the actually existing forms of corporate regulation. In other words, a theory of 
norm creation in the context of global market activities might not be found through a 
mere extension or translation of nation state based doctrine onto a rudimentarily defi-
ned sphere ‘beyond’ or ‘outside’ the nation state. What is needed, instead, is a theory 
that allows for a reflection on the manifold ways in which norms have been emerging in 
the space between what we refer to as the ‘domestic’ on the one hand and the ‘global’ 
on the other. As shall be elaborated in the following, for a legal theory of global regula-
tion, ‘space’ is not meant to depict a geographical realm, but instead a methodological 
one in which the meanings – and, limitations – of our distinction between the ‘national’ 
and the ‘global’ can be addressed. 
Such a reflection must incorporate a high degree of empirical evidence of existing 
forms of self-regulation such as codes of conduct, of recommendations, ‘social norms’6 
or ‘governing contracts’7, but it must do so against the background of a theoretical in-
vestigation into the concept of law, which underlies and informs the almost habitual, 
routine distinction between ‘law’ on the one hand and these myriad forms of ‘alternative 
forms of regulation’ on the other. The lawyer (as any other scientist) cannot simply ‘go 
out and see’, but must account for the conceptual bias with which this confrontation 
with ‘reality’ occurs. In this process, the study of the fast-proliferating forms of public-
private, hybrid norms that apply to market activity, turns into a self-reflection on the 
theoretical starting points of the larger legal theory from the vantage point of which this 
incorporation of empirical evidence takes place.8 It is, thus, not simply an option to 
build a theory on, say, the ‘fact’ of ubiquitous forms of market self-regulation, but 
                                                 
5  Colin Scott, 'Regulatory Governance and the Challenge of Constitutionalism' (2010) EUI Working Papers Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Private Regulation Series-02 http://ucd. 
6  Lisa Bernstein, 'Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry' 
(1992) 21 Journal of Legal Studies 115 
7  See the contributions to the Symposium: ‘Governing Contracts: Public and Private Perspectives’ (2007) 14 Indi-
ana Journal of Global Legal Studies 183-483. 
8  Stewart Macaulay, 'Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts about the Ideas of Ian Macneil 
and Lisa Bernstein' (2000) 94 Northwestern University Law Review 775; Gregory Shaffer and Victoria Nourse, 
'Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can A New World Order Prompt A New Legal Theory?' (2009) 61 Cornell 
Law Review 61 
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instead a necessary reflection on how one or more existing theories of how legal norms 
are in fact incorporate and account for this particular empirical evidence.  
The core contention of this paper is that the challenging nature of the regulation of 
global corporate conduct requires an adequately differentiated approach towards the 
identification and analysis of the norms in question. The central question, which will be 
addressed is: “What is the concept of law that underlies the regulation of global corpora-
te conduct?” I will try to suggest an answer by proceeding in three steps. First, I will 
take issue with the frequently found contention that global corporate conduct is, in view 
of the alleged inability or, exhaustion of states to effectively ‘intervene’, foremost a 
matter of self-regulating markets. This part of our discussion will require a scrutiny of 
what lawyers seem to mean when they refer to the market. In a second step, I will argue 
that an exemplary area such as corporate governance can best be understood as an in-
stance of what I call transnational legal pluralism, that is as a field that becomes visible 
through a particular methodological lens, which revisits the longstanding legal sociolo-
gical analysis of norm creation in the transnational arena. In order to illustrate this ap-
proach, the following section will provide a brief introduction into the place and rele-
vance of corporate governance codes in the present evolution of this regulatory area. A 
particular emphasis will here be placed on the particular nature and dynamics of over-
lapping forms of state and non-state, hard and soft regulation. In conclusion, the last 
section will suggest how the lessons of such a case study can contribute to an ongoing 
theoretical investigation into the nature of global regulatory governance. 
B. MARKETS AND STATES AS REFERENCE POINTS IN THE REGULATION 
DEBATE 
I. The ‘Death of the State by Globalisation’-Thesis 
Even if we were to accept recommendations to let markets govern themselves because 
the nature of global capitalism allegedly meant an end for unilateral, autonomous natio-
nal Keynesian economic policies9, this would still not jive with the general contention 
that globalisation enslaves, dis-empowers and overwhelms states – as an agent in itself. 
What is wrong with this picture is the juxtaposition of the state and globalisation as two 
quasi-actors who are involved in a struggle over regulatory authority, ending with glo-
balization getting the upper hand. What is right, if anything about this claim, however, 
is that this perspective has been extremely pervasive in the context of dramatic changes 
in the way that states have been operating over the last decades, a transformation that 
has – again and again – been associated with the expansion of globalisation. At the basis 
                                                 
9  Thomas L Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (Random House, 2000) 
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of such contentions of the ‘death’ or the ‘retreat’ of the state are, above, all accounts of 
how particular regulatory approaches, which have their origin in state-based models of 
legal and political regulation, are no longer adequate to govern activities that are seen to 
dramatically transcend the jurisdictional and authoritative scope of state competence. 
The welfare state’s regulatory ‘crisis’ of the 1970s in the face of an exponentially grown 
budget, the oil price shock and the growing awareness of the state’s limits in designing 
adequately sophisticated policy programmes for a highly differentiated, pluralist socie-
ty10 finds itself exacerbated in the nation state’s crisis in an era of globalisation.11 
By contrast, at least two accounts of rich evidence of what states actually ‘do’, chal-
lenge this perception in a fundamental way. On the one hand, there are by now a great 
number of pertinent accounts related to the changes in administrative governance within 
the nation state that illustrate a far-reaching transformation of the state in a plethora of 
regulatory fields. The ongoing investigations among administrative and constitutional 
lawyers, political scientists, sociologists and regulatory theorists give ample evidence of 
how the state has long been increasingly involved in complex collaborations, delegati-
ons, trade-offs, and myriad other divisions of labour with civil society or, ‘market’ ac-
tors.12 At the same time, there is a rich repository of studies related to the creation and 
nature of norms in the context of market self-regulation, that point not to the end of the 
state, but rather suggest a highly complex relationship between state and non-state ac-
tors in the production and administration of these norms.13 
                                                 
10  Jürgen Habermas, 'The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of Utopian Energies 
[1985]' in J Habermas (ed) The New Conservatism Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate [ed and transl 
by Shierry Weber Nicholsen] (MIT Press, 1989) 
11  See the critical discussion by Fritz W. Scharpf, 'The viability of advanced welfare states in the international econ-
omy: vulnerabilities and options' (2000) 7 Journal of European Public Policy 190. 
12  See e.g. Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, 'Searching for Civil Society: Changing Patterns of Governance in Brit-
ain' (2003) 81 Public Administration 41; Richard J. Stillman II, 'Twenty-First Century United States Governance: 
Statecraft and the Peculiar Governing Paradox it Perpetuates' (2003) 81 Public Administration 19; Robert Elgie, 
'Governance Traditions and Narratives in Public Sector Reform in Contemporary France' (2003) 81 Public Ad-
ministration 141; Martin Loughlin, 'The Functionalist Style in Public Law' (2005) 55 UTLJ 361 
13  Lisa Bernstein, 'Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business 
Norms' (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1765; Gillian Hadfield, 'The Public and the Private in 
the Provision of Law for Global Services' in V Gessner (ed) Contractual Certainty in International Trade Em-
pirical Studies and Theoretical Debates on Institutional Support for Global Economic Exchanges (Hart Publish-
ing, 2009); for a discussion, see e.g. Gralf-Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running 
Code: A Theory of Transnational Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2010), ch. 2. 
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As a result, the picture of law’s limits or, even, exhaustion with regard to global 
market begins to lose its sharp contours. What we see is not the futile struggle of nation 
states playing a regulatory and policy catch-up game with de-territorialised corporate 
and commercial actors or other amorphous crystallizations of globalization forces. 
Instead, an image begins to form of a rising number of actors with the capacity to ex-
pand indeed on a vast territorial and operational scale. At the same time, we witness an 
intricate overlapping of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ norms, which are being produced by both state 
and non-state actors in the regulation of these activities. The state, far from being a vic-
tim of larger globalisation forces, is instead deeply involved in the production and ad-
ministration of the norms that govern the global market place14, even if he is by far not 
the sole author of governing regulations.15 
This constellation invites analysis from a host of perspectives, and the intriguing em-
phasis placed by legal scholars in the recent past on the importance of ‘regulation’ and 
‘governance’ is an important and crucial element in this regard.16 It is becoming increa-
singly clear that a legal theory of these forms of regulation ‘within’ and ‘beyond’ the 
nation state cannot be adequately developed from within, but must instead take into ac-
count how existing forms of regulation testify to an intricate overlap of different forms 
and concepts of regulation. The impressive rise in importance of new institutional eco-
nomics in the idea competition over ‘governance’ is of eminent importance in this re-
gard.17 As a result, ‘economic governance’18 has developed into a sophisticated regulato-
ry theory that must be taken seriously by anyone interested in the evolution of regulato-
ry governance – which certainly should include lawyers.19 As this short paper cannot do 
                                                 
14  See e.g. Saskia Sassen, 'The State and Globalization' in JS Nye and JD Donahue (eds), Governance in a Globaliz-
ing World (Brookings Institution, 2000). 
15  Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker, 'The Emergence of Private Authority in the International System' 
in RB Hall and TJ Biersteker (eds), The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2002); A. Claire Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the 
Global Economy (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
16  Colin Scott, 'Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post Regulatory State' in J Jordana and D 
Levi-Faur (eds), The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance (Ed-
ward Elgar, 2004); Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation. Texts and Mate-
rials (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
17  See Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), and Oliver E. Williamson, 'The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead' (2000) 
38 Journal of Economic Literature 595. 
18  Oliver E. Williamson, 'The Economics of Governance' (2005) 95 American Economic Review 1. 
19  Peer Zumbansen and Gralf-Peter Calliess, 'Law, Economics and Evolutionary Theory: State of the Art and Inter-
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justice to the rich and wide-ranging exchanges between lawyers and economists on the 
respective boundaries and overlaps between their fields already under way20, I will sug-
gest to focus, instead, on the one concept that occupies a crucial and yet strangely unde-
fined place in this interaction, the market. The general contention that there is a choice 
between state ‘intervention’ and ‘self-regulating markets’ regularly operates with see-
mingly self-explanatory concepts of each. As we have seen with regard to the ‘state’ 
and its presumed demise in the face of globalization, this can easily be very misleading. 
Against the background of an extensive critique of the alleged neutral nature of quasi-
natural markets21, we shall in the following section briefly revisit Karl Polanyi’s depic-
tion of market disembeddedness as a crucial step in the analysis of economic regulation, 
before looking more closely at the changing perceptions of the state in this context. 
II. Markets And Their Global Disembeddedness 
1. Society as an Adjunct to the Market 
In his famous chapters on “Societies and Economic Systems” and the “Evolution of the 
Market Pattern”, which we today refer to for the concept of the embeddedness of the 
market, the political economist Karl Polanyi writes: 
“Though the institution of the market was fairly common since the later Stone Age, its 
role was no more than incidental to economic life.”22 
                                                                                                                                               
disciplinary Perspectives' in P Zumbansen and G-P Calliess (eds), Law, Economics and Evolutionary Theory 
(Edward Elgar, 2010) 
20  For the area of international law, see the vivid disputes around the concept of customary law: Jack Goldsmith and 
Eric Posner, The Limits of International Law (Harvard University Press, 2005), Andrew T. Guzman, How Inter-
national Law Works. A Rational Choice Theory (Oxford University Press, 2008), and Oona A. Hathaway and 
Ariel N. Lavinbuk, 'Rationalism and Revisionism in International Law' (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 1404, 
Paul Schiff Berman, 'Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law: Jack L. Goldsmith/Eric A. Posner, The 
Limits of International Law' (2006) 84 Texas Law Review 1265; for the area of corporate law, see e.g. Gillian K. 
Hadfield and Eric Talley, 'On Public versus Private Provision of Corporate Law' (2006) 22 Journal of Law, Eco-
nomics & Organization 414, and Peer Zumbansen, 'Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism and 
the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law' (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 769. 
21  Robert L. Hale, 'Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State' (1923) 38 Political Science 
Quarterly 470; Morris R. Cohen, 'Property and Sovereignty' (1927) 13 Cornell Law Quarterly 8; Kerry Rittich, 
'Functionalism and Formalism: Their latest Incarnations in Contemporary Development and Governance Debates' 
(2005) 55 University of Toronto Law Journal 853. 
22  Karl Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of our Time (Beacon Press, 
1944)), p. 43; this passage is later complemented – in the same chapter – by his remarks about “man as a social 
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A little later, he remarks that: 
“The outstanding discovery of recent historical and anthropological research is that 
man’s economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships. […] Neither the 
process of production nor that of distribution is linked to specific economic interests at-
tached to the possession of goods; but every single step in that process is geared to a 
number of social interests which eventually will be very different in a small hunting or 
fishing community than those in a vast despotic society, but in either case the economic 
system will be run on non-economic motives.”23 
As is well known, this chapter (4) concludes in the elaboration of the three famous mar-
ket-structuring and market–organising principles: “reciprocity” (related to family and 
kinship), “re-distribution” (the central collection and dissemination of production – “… 
these functions of an economic system proper are completely absorbed by the intensive-
ly vivid experiences which offer superabundant non-economic motivation for every act 
performed in the frame of the social system as a whole.” (p. 48)), and “householding” 
(oeconomia), which precedes the rising levels of division of labour, as well as the role 
of money and credit. Building on this taxonomy in Chapter 5, entitled “Evolution of the 
Market Pattern”, Polanyi famously notes that: 
“the control of the economic system by the market is of overwhelming consequence to 
the whole organization of society: it means no less than the running of society as an ad-
junct to the market. Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social rela-
tions are embedded in the economic system.”24 
It is here, where, as under a magnifying glass, we not only find the kernel of the critique 
of capitalism unfolding in the latter half of the Twentieth century, which has returned 
onto our agenda with the greatest urgency today,25 but also a powerful illustration of the 
differentiation concept of contemporary modern sociology, most strikingly, the thesis of 
the hegemony of the economic system in a functionally-differentiated society.26 Polanyi 
writes: 
                                                                                                                                               
being” (ibid., p. 46): “His natural endowments reappear with a remarkable constancy in societies of all times and 
places; and the necessary preconditions of the survival of human society appear to be immutably the same.” 
23  Polanyi, note 1 supra, p. 46. 
24  Polanyi, note 1 supra, p. 57. 
25  See, for example, J.Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New 
International (Routledge, 1994)); R. Richard Rorty, Das kommunistische Manifest 150 Jahre danach (Suhrkamp, 
1998)). 
26  N. Niklas Luhmann, Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft (Suhrkamp, 1988)). 
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“The vital importance of the economic factor to the existence of society precludes any 
other result. For once the economic system is organized in separate institutions, based 
on specific motives and conferring a special status, society must be shaped in such a 
manner as to allow that system to function according to its own laws. This is the mean-
ing of the familiar assertion that a market economy can function only in market soci-
ety.”27 
A little further on, follows a devastatingly prophetic observation of competitive mar-
kets: 
“With every step that the state took to rid the market of particularist restrictions, of tolls 
and prohibitions, it imperiled the organized system of production and distribution which 
was now threatened by unregulated competition and the intrusion of the interloper who 
‘scooped’ the market but offered no guarantee of permanency.”28 
2. The Exaggerated News of the Death of the State  
At the beginning of the Twenty-first century and in midst of a dramatic financial and 
economic crisis, can it be important – and even beneficial - to rely on Polanyi to help us 
think through the challenges of end-of-history market regulation? Can his observations 
offer analytical tools for an adequate explanation of contemporary markets? In this pa-
per, I suggest that while Polanyi’s analysis of market disembeddedness remains a cent-
ral pillar in our continuing assessment of the meaning of market regulation, we are well 
advised to complement his analysis by a further inquiry into the transformation of regu-
latory actors and instruments that are pertinent in this field. Such an inquiry, however, 
must go beyond a mere contemplation as to which degree lawyers ought to take insights 
from sociologists and political scientists into account when they are designing suppo-
sedly more ‘effective’ or ‘better’ forms of regulation, as pursued – for example – by the 
European Commission.29 I suggest that such an inquiry must be above all a methodolo-
gical one, meaning that it must take seriously the competition among different regulato-
ry approaches, above all law and economics – not ‘law & economics’. 
My argument has two parts and in the first focuses on – and rejects – the much alle-
ged ‘loss of state sovereignty and regulatory exhaustion’ perception that underlies many 
of the crisis policy arguments today. The second step of the argument is concerned with 
the competition between law and alternative approaches to regulation, most prominently 
captured today, on the part of lawyers, by references to ‘soft’ law, codes of conduct, 
                                                 
27  Ibid. 
28  Polanyi, supra, p. 66. 
29  http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/index_en.htm 
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‘governance through disclosure’ or ‘social norms’ and, on the part of in particular New 
Institutional Economics, by the distinction between ‘informal’ and ‘formal’ modes of 
regulation. 
As concerns the first step of my argument: it starts from a perceived loss in confiden-
ce among lawyers with regard to their ability to provide for adequate regulatory tools. It 
posits in particular that a legal theoretical analysis of the changing forms of regulation 
in this area can carve out promising perspectives on the distinct role of law and legal 
regulation in what has become a highly diversified and multi-layered regulatory lands-
cape, where in fact law is no longer supreme. Such a perspective, I suggest, could be a 
promising response to the perception prevailing today that the only way to address the 
tremendous economic, financial and social fall-out of the current crisis would be a ‘re-
turn of the state’. The Achilles heel of this approach is its misrepresentation of the role 
played by the state and its sweeping attempts over the last thirty years to enhance the 
global competitiveness of national firms through the facilitation of a wide-ranging net-
work of self-regulating norm clusters in corporate and commercial law as well as in 
securities regulation. As has been aptly analysed, the past three decades, usually coun-
ted from the enthronement of Thatcher and Reagan30, have seen less a retreat, demise or 
death of the state, than a fundamental transformation in the way that the state has been 
involved in the global proliferation of market regulation.31 Images of ‘more’ state now 
in contrast to an alleged ‘less’ or, weaker or retreated state yesterday are misleadingly 
suggesting a choice of quantity, rather than quality. As becomes strikingly obvious in 
the analysis of the evolving forms of regulation in the named fields, the role of the state, 
far from diminishing, has instead changed from the primary or exclusive author of bin-
ding norms (and, of course, this depiction is itself untenable and overstated32) to being 
one among other highly influential actors involved in the collaborative, experimental, 
                                                 
30  Ronald Dore, William Lazonick and Mary O'Sullivan, 'Varieties of Capitalism in the Twentieth Century' (1999) 
15 Oxford Review of Economic Policy (Oxford Rev Econ Pol'y) 102; Ronald Dore, 'Financialization of the Global 
Economy' (2008) 17 Industrial and Corporate Change 1097. 
31  David Levi-Faur, 'The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism' (2005) 598 The Annals of The American Acad-
emy of Political and Social Science 12; Julia Black and David Rouch, 'The development of global markets as 
rule-makers: engagement and legitimacy' (2008) Law and Financial Markets Review 218; Gralf-Peter Calliess, 
'Transnational Civil Regimes: Economic Globalization and the Evolution of Commercial Law' in V Gessner (ed) 
Contractual Certainty in International Trade Empirical Studies and Theoretical Debates on Institutional Support 
for Global Economic Exchanges (Hart Publishing, 2009) 
32  Harry W. Arthurs, Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century England 
(University of Toronto Press, 1988) 
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direct and indirect production of norms relevant to particular areas of market activity.33 
It is against this background, that our analysis has to strive for a better understanding of 
the changing form of the state34 while at the same time challenge the frequently found 
perception that the state is in fact the only legitimate and competent law-making autho-
rity. Such a shift in perspective is mandatory in order to take into the view the myriad 
forms that the state has for the longest time been involved in a permanent transformati-
on of sovereignty in various directions. The state’s entanglement in the far-reaching 
regulation of markets, the provision of subsidies (including large-scale ‘bail-outs’ as in 
present times) and institutional guarantees in areas such as health, education, security or 
infrastructure are only some of the domestic illustrations of this fact35, while the state’s 
engagement with other states, governments, supra-national organisations, INGOs and 
global civil society actors illustrates another, more ‘outward’-oriented relativisation of 
state sovereignty.36 
The following observations are limited to what can at best be a cursory study of the 
institutional and conceptual dimensions of a particular form of market regulation illus-
trated by the example of corporate governance codes. Such an investigation offers a host 
of insights into the particular way in which market regulation has been evolving in a 
framework that cannot be adequately depicted as either national or international, public 
or private. Instead, the particular relation between state and non-state actors in the initia-
tion and execution of the norm-creation process and the ensuing implementation, dis-
semination and administration of the norms in question defy categorisations through 
which we would like to neatly assign the authority for such a particular regulatory re-
gime to one side or the other. The chosen field, corporate governance, is a case in point 
in the study of transnational law making, as I will try to argue by scrutinizing both the 
underlying meaning of transnational and the concept of law informing this approach. I 
                                                 
33  See for an insightful discussion: Colin Scott, 'Regulating Everything' (2008) Inaugural Lecture, University Col-
lege Dublin, School of Law, 2622008 http://geary.ucd.ie/mapping/images/Documents/RegEverything.pdf. 
34  See hereto also Stephen Bell and Andrew Hindmoor, Rethinking Governance. The Centrality of the State in Mod-
ern Society (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
35  Michael Stolleis, 'Die Entstehung des Interventionsstaates und das öffentliche Recht' (1989) 11 ZNR 129; but see 
as well the rich analysis in the context of the ‚Varieties of Capitalism’-School: Peter A. Hall and David Soskice 
(eds), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford University 
Press, 2001); Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura (eds), The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism in Germany 
and Japan (Cornell Studies in Political Economy, Cornell University Press, 2001). 
36  Mary Kaldor, 'The Idea of Global Civil Society' (2003) 79 International Affairs 583; Saskia Sassen, 'The State 
and Globalization' in JS Nye and JD Donahue (eds), Governance in a Globalizing World (Brookings Institution, 
2000) 
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will argue, that areas such as corporate governance regulation must today be understood 
as instances of “global assemblages”,37 or, from a legal theoretical viewpoint, as exam-
ples of transnational legal pluralism.38 As such, a regulatory field such as corporate 
governance is, on the one hand, neither exclusively national (domestic) nor interna-
tional, while, on the other, this does not imply the elimination or the overcoming of the 
nation state.39 In addition, such an area does not jive with the public/private distinction 
as applied to the nature of the norm-creating actor that is so central to our learned ways 
of assigning law-making authority.40 Instead, these assemblages, in their description 
through Saskia Sassen, are constituted through persistent local activity and interpreta-
tion, and are - as such - comprised of human, institutional and technological elements, 
the latter resulting pre-dominantly from the breathtaking advances in information tech-
nology (“digitalisations”).41 In contrasting the concept of transnational legal pluralism 
with that of Sassen’s global assemblages, I will suggest that, despite the convincing 
account of the changed and yet crucial relationship between the national and the global 
spheres, which Sassen presents, there is a continuing need for a specifically legal per-
spective on the re-configuration of “spaces and places” which is so powerfully shaping 
human activity and policies. It is this emphasis on the legal theoretical re-construction 
of both Polanyi’s theme of embeddedness and of Sassen’s metaphor of assemblages that 
holds considerable promise for rendering a timely concept of transnational markets. In 
order to carve out such a distinctly legal theoretical perspective, it is necessary to place 
the existing assessments of the relationship between the state and the market into a lar-
ger discursive context, namely that of global governance, for it is here that we can find 
                                                 
37  For this concept, see S. Sassen, Territory - Authority - Rights. From Medieval to Global Assemblages, (Princeton 
NJ-Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006); for earlier elaborations, see idem, The Global City, (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1991), and idem, Globalization and Its Discontents. Essays on the New Mobility of 
People and Money, (New York: The New Press, 1998); see, also, M. Amstutz & V. Karavas, “Weltrecht: Ein 
Derridasches Monster”, in: G.-P. Calliess, A. Fischer-Lescano, D. Wielsch & P. Zumbansen, (eds), Soziologische 
Jurisprudenz. Liber Amicorum für Gunther Teubner zum 65. Geburtstag, (Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 
2009), pp. 647-674. 
38  P. Zumbansen, “‘New Governance’ in European Corporate Governance Regulation as Transnational Legal Plu-
ralism”, (2008) 15 European Law Journal, pp. 246-276, available at:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1128145; P. Zum-
bansen, Transnational Legal Pluralism, forthcoming in (2010) 1:2 Transnational Legal Theory, available as CLPE 
Research Paper 01/2010, at:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1542907 
39  Sassen, 2006, note 8 supra, p. 325. 
40  Carol Harlow, '"Public" and "Private" Law: Definition without Distinction' (1980) 43 Modern Law Review 241 
41  Sassen, 2006, note 8 supra, p. 349 (noting the importance of focusing on financial centres, not “markets”, “as key 
nested communities enabling the construction and functioning of such cultures of interpretation”. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 128) 
- 12 - 
important stimuli for a renewed reflection on the emerging role of law in a concert of 
competing regulatory theories. 
C. TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PLURALISM 
I. The Ambivalence of Global Governance 
The wide-ranging discourses around ‘global governance’ offer an important opportunity 
to gain new and further insights into the building blocks of an emerging legal, political 
and economic order. The struggle with the absence of ‘world government’ is undeniably 
a struggle - over the form and legitimacy of – any – government itself. As such, current 
inquiries into the role of the state and the nature of legal regulation are charged with the 
translation of an extremely rich repository of rights critique, ‘law and society’ scholar-
ship, ‘law and economics’ analysis, and legal anthropology into the discourses unfold-
ing under the umbrella of an interdisciplinary study of transnational regulatory regimes. 
Such a research agenda develops against the background of the ‘anti-positivist’ origins 
of legal pluralism42, which eventually evolved into a highly differentiated and empiri-
cally driven analysis of co-existing and overlapping regulatory regimes.43 The emer-
gence of ‘governance studies’44 and the increasingly influential study of law through a 
regulatory lens45 testify to an important widening and deepening of the legal analytical 
apparatus. Seen in this light, the present obsession with the alleged novelty of a ‘global’ 
legal and political order has direct ties to preceding contestations of welfare state gov-
ernments and their aftermaths in the last two decades, including a significant function-
                                                 
42  Richard Ashby Wilson, 'Tyrannosaurus Lex: The Anthropology of Human Rights and Transnational Law' in M 
Goodale and SE Merry (eds), The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law Between the Global and the Local 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), 345. 
43  Sally Engle Merry, 'Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes' (1992) 21 Annual Review of Anthropology 
357; Sally Engle Merry, 'New Legal Realism and the Ethnography of Transnational Law' (2006) 31 Law & Social 
Inquiry 975; Gregory Shaffer and Victoria Nourse, 'Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can A New World Order 
Prompt A New Legal Theory?' (2009) 61 Cornell Law Review 61. 
44  See e.g., Scott Burris, Michael Kempa and Clifford Shearing, 'Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary 
Review of Current Scholarship' (2008) 41 Akron Law Review 1. 
45  Colin Scott, 'Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post Regulatory State' in J Jordana and D 
Levi-Faur (eds), The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance (Ed-
ward Elgar, 2004); Colin Scott, 'Regulatory Governance and the Challenge of Constitutionalism' (2010) EUI 
Working Papers Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Private Regulation Series-02 http://ucd; see also 
Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation. Texts and Materials (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
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alisation of regulatory policies and legal principles.46 Accordingly, much needed inquir-
ies into previous experiences with rights regimes are fuelled by grave concerns over 
democratic representation47 but remain torn between references to state-to-state relations 
and a concern with global ‘citizens’48, as well as over the politics of (domestic) hard and 
(global) soft laws49 and the nature of rights50 on a global scale.51 Finally, the competing 
assertions of market regulation, before and since the unfolding of the current global fi-
nancial and economic crisis52, call for a renewed assessment of the legal nature of mar-
                                                 
46  Orly Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought' (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 342; Peer Zumbansen, 'Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, 
Functionalism and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law' (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 769. 
47  David Held, 'Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness from a Cosmopolitan Perspective' (2004) 39 
Government and Opposition 364; David Held, 'Reframing Global Governance: Apocalypse Soon or Reform!' in 
D Held and A McGrew (eds), Globalization Theory Approaches and Controversies (Polity, 2007); Regina 
Kreide, 'The Ambivalence of Juridification. On Legitimate Governance in the International Context' (2009) 2 
Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric 18. 
48  For an insightful discussion, see Rainer Forst, 'Towards a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice' in T Pogge 
(ed) Global Justice (Blackwell Publishing, 2001). 
49  Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, 'In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change in Global Politics' in W 
Mattli and N Woods (eds), The Politics of Global Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
50  See, for example, Duncan Kennedy, 'The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies' in W Brown and J Halley 
(eds), Left Legalism/Left Critique (Duke University Press, 2002); see also Conor Gearty, Can Human Rights Sur-
vive? (2005 Hamlyn Lectures) (Cambridge University Press, 2006), in particular ch. 3. Still a very insightful cri-
tique is provided by Crawford Brough Macpherson, 'The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice' (1987) in: Macpher-
son, The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice, and other Essays The role of state, class and property in twentieth-
century democracy 1, in particular ch. 2: ‘Problems of Human Rights in the Late Twentieth Century’. 
51  Sundhya Pahuja, 'Rights as Regulation: The Integration of Development and Human Rights' in B Morgan (ed) 
The Intersection of Rights and Regulation (Ashgate, 2008); Fleur E. Johns, 'Global Governance: An Heretical 
History Play' (2004) 4 Global Jurist Advances Art. 3 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=603232), 11, 29, 37: ‘The space of 
global governance, as described in these writings [referencing work by John Coffee Jr., Richard Falk, Anne-
Marie Slaughter and others, PZ], is a realm aspiring to be one of coherence and predestination. It is a space in 
which earthly divisions are to melt away before the final judgment of the market or the universal decrees of hu-
man rights. In this domain, the actions of governments, corporations, laborers, employers, even refugees are fused 
into pre-inscribed patterns of convergence.’ See also Joseph Raz, 'Human Rights in the Emerging World Order' 
(2010) 1 Transnational Legal Theory 31. 
52  See e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Freefall. America, Free Markets and the Sinking of the World Economy (W.W. Nor-
ton & Co., 2010), and Christian Marazzi, The Violence of Financial Capitalism (Edizioni Casagrande, 2010). 
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kets, long ago scrutinized by Legal Realist scholars53 as well as of the particular forms 
of legal and non-legal regulation that remain at the centre of ‘law and society’54 scholar-
ship and studies of ‘legal pluralism’.55 It is being increasingly recognized that such in-
quiry cannot remain confined to a discipline or field on its own: branches of economics 
as well as a wide range of ‘social sciences’ have been called upon to contribute to the 
emergence of a more layered and more differentiated concept of ‘regulatory govern-
ance’56, of which the field of corporate governance is a most telling illustration. 
II. The Emergence of Transnational Regulatory Landscapes 
Corporate governance has to be seen in the context of a highly diversified series of 
transnational norm-setting processes resulting in a veritable explosion of corporate gov-
ernance codes in Europe and elsewhere. With the proliferation of corporate governance 
codes, influenced and pushed by international57 and transnational activities of norm set-
ting, discussion and thought exchange58, it has become increasingly difficult to identify 
a single institution or author of a set of norms. Instead, much of the production and dis-
semination of corporate governance rules operates through the migration of standards59 
and a cross-fertilisation of norms. A distinct feature of this de-territorialised production 
                                                 
53  Hale and Cohen, supra, note 20. 
54  Lawrence M. Friedman, 'Coming of Age: Law and Society Enters an Exclusive Club' (2005) Annual Review of 
Law and Social Sciences 1. 
55  Sally Engle Merry, 'Legal Pluralism' (1988) 22 Law & Society Review 869; Harry W. Arthurs, Without the Law: 
Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century England (University of Toronto Press, 1988); 
Derek McKee, ‘Review Essay - Context and Commitment: A Pluralist Perspective on the Paradox of Law (On 
Melissaris’ Ubiquitous Law)’ (2010) 11 German Law Journal 573-584. 
56  Oliver E Williamson, The Economics of Governance, Nobel Prize Lecture 2009, available at: 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/williamson-lecture.html; see also Oliver E. William-
son, 'The Economics of Governance' (2005) 95 American Economic Review 1; Colin Scott, 'Regulatory Govern-
ance and the Challenge of Constitutionalism' (2010) EUI Working Papers Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies, Private Regulation Series-02 http://ucd; Peer Zumbansen and Gralf-Peter Calliess, 'Law, Economics and 
Evolutionary Theory: State of the Art and Interdisciplinary Perspectives' in P Zumbansen and G-P Calliess (eds), 
Law, Economics and Evolutionary Theory (Edward Elgar, 2010). 
57  OECD; WCFCG; IVCGN 
58  ECGI, INSEAD, Euroshareholders etc. 
59  See for a comparable analysis of migrating human rights standards, Craig Scott and Robert Wai, 'Transnational 
Governance of Corporate Conduct through the Migration of Human Rights Norms: The Potential of Transna-
tional "Private" Litigation' in C Joerges, I-J Sand and G Teubner (eds), Transnational Governance and Constitu-
tionalism (Hart Publishing, 2004). 
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of norms is the radical challenge these processes pose for our understanding of what we 
call law proper. The dissemination of corporate governance codes, disclosure standards 
and rules, best practices and codes of conduct, affects the entire juridical ‘nexus of cor-
porate governance’ as comprised of norms pertaining to company law, labour law and 
securities regulation60, as the decentralisation of norm producers is repeated, mirrored 
and reflected in the hybridisation of the norms themselves. It is in this sense, that the 
study of the proliferation of corporate governance codes and company law production in 
general and of the rules of remuneration disclosure in particular feeds into a broader 
research inquiry into the changing face of legal regulation in globally integrated mar-
ketplaces. 
Against this background, corporate governance emerges today as a product of the 
fundamental transformations of regulatory instruments and institutions. As corporate 
law is being shaped by a complex mixture of public, private, state- and non-state-based 
norms, principles and rules, generated, disseminated and monitored by a diverse set of 
actors, a closer look at this field can serve two purposes, both of which this paper 
briefly addresses: one is the way in which the analysis of contemporary corporate gov-
ernance regulation can help us to assess the emerging, new framework within which 
corporate governance, but also other rules of market regulation are evolving. Secondly, 
through the way in which we begin to understand this emerging transnational regulatory 
framework as an illustration of contemporary rule-making, the long-standing legal plu-
ralist contention of formal and informal legal orders comes to be seen in a new light. In 
light of, on the one hand, early legal-sociological work by Ehrlich (“living law”) and 
Gurvitch (“social law”), this leads us to re-visit the core question of any sociology of 
law, namely, how “to investigate the correlations between law and other spheres of cul-
ture”.61 Expanding the spectrum, on the other hand, with a view to the legal pluralist 
work of scholars such as Moore (“semi-autonomous field”), Galanter, Macaulay, Sousa 
Santos or Teubner, contemporary assessments of “hybrid legal spaces” (Schiff Berman) 
- not sufficiently captured with references to local or national contexts - might help us 
better understand the distinctly transnational emergence of regulatory regimes. The 
transnational lens allows us to study such regimes not as being entirely detached from 
                                                 
60  See John W. Cioffi, Public Law and Private Power: Corporate Governance Reform in the United States and 
Germany in an Age of Finance Capitalism (forthcoming) (Cornell University Press, 2010). 
61  E. Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, (orig. published in German as Grundlegung der 
Soziologie des Rechts, 1913) (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), pp. 486-506, “The Study of the living law”; 
G. Gurvitch, Sociology of Law, (orig. published in French as Problèmes de la sociologie du droit) (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1947); M. Rheinstein, “Review: Two Recent Books on Sociology of Law [reviewing 
Timasheff’s ‘Introduction’ and Gurvitch’s ‘Elements’]” (1941) 51 Ethics, pp. 220-231, at 221-2. 
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national political and legal orders, but as emerging out of them, and reaching beyond 
them. The transnational dimension of the new actors and the newly emerging forms of 
norms radicalises their semi-autonomous nature, represented in the tension between a 
‘formal’ law and policy making apparatus on the one hand and the spontaneously evolv-
ing ‘informal’ norms in particular social contexts on the other62, in the following way: 
regulatory spaces are marked by a dynamic and often problematically-instrumentalised 
tension between formal and informal norm-making processes. The way in which evolv-
ing governance regimes can fast adapt to the challenges that arise from national political 
economies, leads to an exacerbation of the above-described tension without our being 
able to yet adequately depict or theorize these dynamics. The regulatory ‘failure’ of tra-
ditional, state-based legal-political intervention into multinational corporations today63 
has long served as an illustration of the need to develop either distinctly “post-national”, 
institutionalised governance forms, or self-regulatory, soft instruments of voluntary 
binding. While, to the public’s disbelief and to lawyers’ own professional frustration, 
the proposed approaches, ranging from “global jurisdiction”, “torture as tort”, transna-
tional civil human rights litigation, and scandalisation movements including global 
shaming, to soft law instruments, self-binding norms, codes of conduct and best prac-
tices, have so far not been able to solve this riddle, they have at the same time under-
scored the need to fundamentally adapt the analytics of both norm-generation and en-
forcement.64 
This prompts a scrutiny of the position of corporate law within a larger, highly dif-
ferentiated and dynamic regulatory environment. Corporate law unfolds in a web of 
norms, official and unofficial, public and private, from which it receives impulses and 
to which it sends others, and this web is transnational in both origin and reach.65 From a 
traditional perspective, it is marked by a combination, a complementarity and complex 
intersection of domestic and international regulations. By contrast, however, transna-
                                                 
62  Sally Falk Moore, 'Law and Social Change: the semi-autonomous field as an appropriate subject of study' (1973) 
7 Law & Society Review 719. 
63  For an insightful critique of such a perception, however, see Fleur Johns, 'Performing Power: The Deal, Corpo-
rate Rule, and the Constitution of Global Legal Order' (2007) 34 Journal of Law and Society 116. 
64  See the analysis by Craig M. Scott, ''Transnational Law' as Proto-Concept: Three Conceptions' (2009) 10 German 
Law Journal 859. In addition, “governance” studies become more and more important in their cross-disciplinary 
inquiry into changing forms of political and legal regulation: see, for example, the research program of the Uni-
versity of Bremen’s Collaborative Research Centre “Transformations of the State”, available at:  http://www. 
sfb597.uni-bremen.de/. 
65  http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php; http://www.transnationalcorporategovernance.net. 
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tional law (TL), as coined by Philip Jessup in 1956,66 is marked by its unruly structure 
of public, private, domestic and international norms, produced by official and unofficial 
norm-entrepreneurs, which opens an altogether distinct perspective on the distinction 
between ‘national’ and ‘international’. Emphasizing the need to theorize the foundations 
of this distinction, connected Jessup’s project to legal sociological work on the co-
existence of a plurality of legal orders. However well the underlying promise of such a 
shift in perspective was appreciated at the time, Jessup’s proposal did contain an impor-
tant message for the majority of mainstream lawyers, for whom legal pluralism had al-
ways been something exotic and of interest only for those in law with a particular inter-
disciplinary interest in legal sociology, anthropology or regulatory theory. Jessup aimed 
to take a possible concept of transnational law seriously by suggesting to study the in-
triguing parallels between different conflicts of interest that arise both domestically and 
internationally. Of paradigmatic importance here was his example of shareholder de-
mocracy at home and democratic participation (and legitimacy) in international eco-
nomic organisations. By highlighting the inherent parallels between the two regulatory 
fields, which in application of the national/international distinction had been studied in 
isolation from each other, Jessup was able to point to a need to adequately address the 
parallels as a regulatory constellation unfolding in one, not two realms of legal imagina-
tion. To the degree that lawyers increasingly knew more about the regulatory challenges 
that law-makers and judges were facing in different jurisdictions and in which these 
observers and comparative lawyers also began to see that transactions with border-
crossing substance or consequences required a legal response which was adequate to the 
nature of this transaction, which was neither domestic nor international, transnational 
law came more and more into focus.67 
To build upon, but also to move beyond, Jessup, in order to realise transnational 
law’s potential as a tool for the study of the transnational governance regime of corpo-
rate governance, we need to remember that TL can first be understood as a field of law-
making. From this perspective, TL can capture the dramatic proliferation of law-making 
actors and locations (institutional dimension), and the changing nature of legal norms, 
as corporate behaviour is now being shaped by both public and private, official and un-
official, mandated and self-enacted norms (normative dimension). From this perspec-
tive, the proliferation of corporate law-making actors and institutions, and the resulting 
                                                 
66  P.C. Jessup, Transnational Law, (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1956). 
67  Paul Schiff Berman, 'From International Law to Law and Globalization' (2005) 43 Columbia Journal of Transna-
tional Law 485; Paul Schiff Berman, 'Global Legal Pluralism' (2007) 80 Southern California Law Review 1155; 
Ralf Michaels, 'Global Legal Pluralism' (2009) Duke Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No 259 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1430395. 
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hybrid norms, can serve as an illustration for other fields with high political currency, 
given the interests involved in its development. Secondly, and more importantly, how-
ever, is the idea of transnational law as method.68 The focus of the methodology adopted 
here is inspired by Jessup’s suggestion that we should think of a law that is neither pub-
lic nor private international law, but one that captures the mixed – institutional and 
normative – nature of the regulatory regimes. 
As will be shown in more detail in the following section, corporate governance codes 
provide a telling example of this transformation of traditional state-originating, official 
norm-setting in favour of increasingly de-centralised, spatialised processes of norm pro-
duction.69 The very nature of these codes themselves has been changing dramatically as 
a result of this new form of transnational embeddedness. Central to the observation in 
this particular area that this paper focuses on is the particular nature of the regulation of 
business conduct and corporations in globally interdependent activity spheres (marketi-
sation), fundamentally changing national political economies (privatisation), and a dra-
matic expansion of issue-driven, functionalist regulatory regimes (scientisation).70 This 
constellation, however, suggests nothing less than a fundamental contestation and ero-
sion of boundaries between state and non-state actors, official and unofficial law, public 
and private ordering.71 Politics matter still, but they are no longer so easily defined as 
the politics of “The Right” or “The Left”, which we learned to distinguish domestically 
throughout the Twentieth century and right up to the recent shock to the financialised 
global economy. The questions that are raised not only by the commercial, productive, 
                                                 
68  See, already, E. ; Gaillard, “Transnational Law: A Legal System or a Method of Decision Making?”, in: K.P. 
Berger (ed), The Practice of Transnational Law, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), pp. 53-65. 
69  See, in detail, G.-P.Calliess & P. Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of Transnational 
Private Law, (Oxford-Portland OR: Hart Publishing, 2010), pp. 242-345. 
70  For an excellent demarcation of these dimensions, see Gili S. Drori and John W. Meyer, 'Scientization: Making a 
World safe for organizing' in M-L Djelic and K Sahlin-Andersson (eds), Transnational Governance Institutional 
Dynamics of Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
71  See, for example, Volkmar Gessner, Richard P. Appelbaum and William F. Felstiner, 'Introduction: The Legal 
Culture of Global Business Transactions' in V Gessner, RP Appelbaum and WF Felstiner (eds), Rules and Net-
works: The Legal Culture of Global Business Transactions (Hart Publishing, 2001); Volkmar Gessner, 'Theories 
of Change – The Governance of Business Transactions in Globalising Economies' in V Gessner (ed) Contractual 
Certainty in International Trade Empirical Studies and Theoretical Debates on Institutional Support for Global 
Economic Exchanges (Hart Publishing, 2009); Francis Snyder, 'Economic Globalisation and the Law in the 21st 
Century' in A Sarat (ed) The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society (Blackwell, 2004); Katharina Pistor, 'Of 
Legal Transplants, Legal Irritants, and Economic Development' in P Cornelius and B Kogut (eds), Corporate 
Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy (Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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but also the re-distributive, sustainable, R&D related and routine/innovation-related 
activities of corporations do not lend themselves to straight-forward categorisations of 
either public or private, or of domestic or international. In response to this situation, 
transnational law as method suggests an assessment of the emerging regulatory frame-
work while keeping the political questions and issues that continue to arise around par-
ticular regulatory challenges or experiences in view. The importance of transnational 
law as method stems from the observation that we must re-think law and regulation 
without resorting to traditional distinctions in the belief that they will deliver the same 
explanatory potential that we have grown accustomed to: instead, we must approach the 
emerging institutional framework from a transnational regulatory perspective. And it is 
here that comparative corporate law transforms itself into the study of these increasingly 
de-territorialised corporate governance regimes as an illustration of transnational legal 
pluralism. 
D. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES 
The development of corporate governance codes can be seen as an example of intricate, 
domestic and transnational, multi-level processes of norm generation and norm en-
forcement. Starting from mere factual evidence, the emergence of corporate governance 
codes in recent years has begun to fundamentally alter the legal landscape of corporate 
law.72 Despite their recognition as an essential element of corporate law73, these codes 
constitute a particular challenge to other, statutory approaches to law making, as they 
regularly are drafted by non-state actors such as non-governmental associations, private 
industry institutes or corporate actors.74 In general, corporate governance codes are rela-
tively short collections of, on the one hand, legal regulations that are already in force in 
a particular jurisdiction, and recommendations and suggestions, directed either to pri-
vate corporations or, in some cases75, the law maker, concerning a company’s organisa-
                                                 
72  For an overview of so far existing corporate governance codes in various countries, see http://www.ecgi.org/ 
codes/all_codes.php (25 September 2009). 
73  See only Melvin Eisenberg, 'The Architecture of American Corporate Law: Facilitation and Regulation' (2005) 2 
Berkeley Business Law Journal 167, 176, 182. 
74  See, for one of the first examples, the German Corporate Governance Code, the interview with Professor Theodor 
Baums, who chaired the commission that preceded the commission to draft the first German Corporate Govern-
ance Code: Theodor Baums, 'Interview: Reforming German Corporate Governance: Inside a Law Making Process 
of a Very New Nature' (2001) 2 German Law Journal at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php? 
id=43. 
75  See Ulrich Noack and Dirk Zetzsche, 'Corporate Governance in Germany: The Second Decade, Center for Busi-
ness & Corporate Law (CBC) Research Paper Series' (2005) CBC WP No 0010 [http://ssrn.com/ 
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tion, its governance rules and disclosure regime not included in statutory law, on the 
other.76 In the case of the German Corporate Governance Code, for example, recom-
mendations are marked by the word “shall”. While Companies are free to deviate from 
them, they are under an obligation to disclose this deviation.77 By contrast, suggestions 
can be deviated from without disclosure.78 We shall see below how the German legisla-
tor has chosen to transpose this disclosure obligation into statutory law. These hybrid 
norms of corporate regulation79, which are neither exclusively public nor private, pose a 
formidable challenge to traditional thinking about law making authority, non-legal rules 
and their enforcement. The following section will explore the different dimensions of 
corporate governance codes by providing first a general introduction to the regulatory 
issues dealt with under the heading of corporate governance before studying the emer-
gence, legal nature and the enforcement of such codes in greater detail. 
I. What is Corporate Governance? 
The law of corporate governance is one of the fastest developing areas in law making in 
recent years, and discussions about ‘good corporate governance’ have for years now 
been surpassing the confines of academia, occupying media and public debates. In other 
words, “Good corporate governance is a top priority in business worldwide.”80 Along-
                                                                                                                                               
abstract=646761], 6-7. 
76  Christine Mallin, Corporate Governance (Oxford University Press, 2005), 19-40; Jennifer Hill, 'Regulatory Re-
sponses to Global Corporate Scandals' (2005) 23 Wisconsin International Law Journal 367, 376 (highlighting 
how CGC have tended to be either a response to the absence of governmental regulation or a justification of such 
absence); Melvin Eisenberg, 'The Architecture of American Corporate Law: Facilitation and Regulation' (2005) 2 
Berkeley Business Law Journal 167, 182: “bodies of standards, principles, or rules that are promulgated by pri-
vate institutions, and that have force of some sort although they are not directly backed by state sanctions” 
77  Preface, GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2002), at 2, available at:  http://www.bmj.bund.de/enid/ 
Corporate_Governance/German_Corporate_Governance_Code_1gj.html (25 September 2009) 
78  Id. 
79  Richard C. Nolan, 'The Legal Control of Directors’ Conflicts of Interest in the United Kingdom: Non-Executive 
Directors Following the Higgs Report' (2005) 6 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 413, 418: “complex mixtures of pri-
vate and public action”; Richard Mitchell, Anthony O'Donnell and Ian Ramsay, 'Shareholder Value and Em-
ployee Interests: Intersections between Corporate Governance, Corporate Law and Labor Law' (2005) 23 Wiscon-
sin International Law Journal 417, at 451 (clearly distinguishing CGC from law as ‘self-regulation’ or ‘soft law’ 
provisions”) 
80  Jean du Plessis and Claus Luttermann, 'Corporate Governance in the EU, the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Governance in Selected Other Jurisdictions' in JJ du Plessis and others (eds), German 
Corporate Governance in International and European Context (Springer, 2007), 215. 
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side wide-ranging public protest against managers’ self-dealing and excessive pay-
packages, institutional investors have for years now been moving into the center of cor-
porate governance rule making by developing investor protection standards.81 Surely by 
the summer of 2002, when then-President Bush heralded “Corporate Responsibility” in 
the aftermath of the Enron scandals82, corporate governance regulation had come to rank 
high on national and transnational policy agendas.83 With other countries learning about 
their own corpses in the closet84, the high intensity level of policy proposals, domestic 
and transnational law making initiatives has been no less than astounding.85 The world 
wide academic and policy discussion of corporate governance, embedded in numerous 
debates in- and outside of specially empanelled expert commissions, hearings and 
documented by government and working group reports, symposia, articles and volumi-
nous books, had been accompanying an active production of norms on the national and 
the international level.86 Issues of general, even public, concern include managers’ al-
                                                 
81  John C. Coffee Jr., 'Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor' in KJ Hopt and E 
Wymeersch (eds), European Takeovers Law and Practice (Butterworths, 1992); G.P. Stapeldon, 'Institutional In-
vestors: What Are Their Responsibilities as Shareholders?' in J Parkinson, G Kelly and A Gamble (eds), The Po-
litical Economy of the Company (Hart Publishing, 2000); Friedrich Kübler, 'Institutional Investors and Corporate 
Governance: A German Perspective' in T Baums, R Buxbaum and KJ Hopt (eds), Institutional Investors and 
Corporate Governance (Walter de Gruyter, 1994) 
82  See the ABA Presidential Task Force on Corporate Responsibility: Final Report of March 31, 2003, available at: 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/final_report.pdf. The Task Force had been appointed in 
2002; see also the Corporate Responsibility (CORE) Coalition, founded by Amnesty International, Christian Aid, 
Friends of the Earth, New Economics and Traidcraft, more available at: http://www.corporate-responsibility.org/. 
83  See, THE ECONOMIST, 13 July 2002: American capitalism takes a beating; Margaret Blair, 'Post-Enron Reflec-
tions on Comparative Corporate Governance' (2002) <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=316663>, 2-3: 
“Now, in the spring of 2002, the helium has come out of the formerly high-flying technology and information in-
frastructure sectors that were leading U.S. economic expansion in the 1990s, and the Enron fiasco and accounting 
scandals at numerous other corporations have exposed deep flaws in the system that was held up as the model for 
all the world to follow.” 
84  Roger Adams, 'Enron to Parmalat: Now Europe needs to declare war on fraud' International Herald Tribune (web 
edition) (January 14, 2004) available at: http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/01/14/edadams_ed3_.php: “As a result 
of the recent Parmalat case, European attitudes to Enron-like incidents have turned a full 180 degrees from “It 
can’t happen here” to “It has happened — what do we do about it?”“ 
85  See, for example, the speech given by SEC Commissioner (as he then was), Paul S. Atkins, on 5 February 2003, 
on “The Sarbanes Oxley Act: Goals, Content, and Status of Implementation”, available at: http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/spch020503psa.htm (25 September 2009). 
86  For a selection of fruitful introductions to the burgeoning corporate governance debate, see Klaus J. Hopt and 
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leged free-reigning authority to dispose of corporate assets as they see fit, the steep 
amounts of executive compensation packages87 and the seemingly untamed and untam-
able power of corporate actors were part of sweeping policy programmes to make com-
panies and thereby respective national economies more globally competitive.88 Such 
transformations did not, however, occur in a vacuum. Instead, the questions central to 
the global debate over the convergence or divergence of corporate governance standards 
touched upon long-standing governance, control, legitimacy and accountability con-
cepts characterising the large business corporation as it had been regulated in the con-
text of distinct regulatory cultures.89 The literature on these concepts is legacy and has 
been experiencing an exponential growth in the last years.90 For the purpose of this pa-
                                                                                                                                               
others (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance. The State of the Art and Emerging Research (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1998); Joseph A. McCahery and others (eds), Corporate Governance Regimes. Convergence and Di-
versity (Oxford University Press, 2002), and Klaus J. Hopt and others (eds), Corporate Governance in Context. 
Corporations, States and Markets in Europe, Japan and the US (Oxford University Press, 2005); see the concise 
overviews of the contemporary regulatory challenges within the EU by Eddy Wymeersch, 'Convergence or Di-
vergence in Corporate Governance Patterns in Western Europe?' in JA McCahery and others (eds), Corporate 
Governance Regimes Convergence and Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2002), and Luca Enriques and Paolo 
Volpin, 'Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe' (2007) 21 Journal of Economic Perspectives 117. 
87  See the scathing critique by Lucian Ayre Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance. The Unfulfilled 
Promise of Executive Compensation (Harvard University Press, 2004); see hereto William W. Bratton, 'The Aca-
demic Tournament over Executive Compensation' (2005) 93 California Law Review 1557; the scope of executive 
compensation, its components, allocation and disclosure continues to range high on the political agenda: see, for 
example, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 30 June 2008, noting a 20% general increase in CEO pay of Ger-
man companies listed on the DAX index. On 5 August 2009, the new Law on the Adequacy of Executive Com-
pensation (Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung – VorstAG) entered into force, the full text is 
available at: http://www.bmj.de/files/7db813ef5ce3522d02ef3547a4c2f341/3836/gesetz_vorstandsverguetung_ 
VorstAG.pdf. 
88  See already Louis D. Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness (Viking, 1934); Ralph Nader, Mark Green and Joel Selig-
man, Corporate Power in America (Norton, 1974); Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Muller, Global Reach: The 
Power of the Multinational Corporations (Simon and Schuster, 1974); David C. Korten, When Corporations Rule 
the World (Barrett-Koehler Publishers and Kumerian Press, 1995). 
89  See Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932); with regard 
to Germny, see the excellent accounts by Detlev Vagts, 'Reforming the 'Modern Corporation': Perspectives from 
the German' (1966) 80 Harvard Law Review 23, and Thomas Raiser, 'The Theory of Enterprise Law in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany' (1988) 36 American Journal of Comparative Law 111, 115, providing a concise, ex-
cellently informed brief historical outline of the regulatory development. 
90  William W. Bratton, 'Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn' (2001) 26 Journal of Corporate Law 
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per, I shall only very briefly mention a number of central elements in the heightened 
debate over corporate governance standards before focusing more closely on the spe-
cific transnational dimension of corporate governance codes and their place in the 
evolving framework of corporate law making. 
Corporate governance relates to the exercise of powers inside the firm: the analytical 
focus can, for one, be directed to the relationship between the owner (shareholder; prin-
cipal) and the management (agent). Alternatively, one may focus on the overall organ-
isational structure of the firm. While this also includes the principal-agent ties, it also 
encompasses the other ‘stakeholders’ in the firm, such as employees and creditors. The 
first, control-oriented approach centres on shareholders as the prime residual claimants 
of the firm: therefore, the firm’s organisation is governed by the overriding principle of 
maximizing ‘shareholder value’.91 The other, stakeholder oriented, approach considers 
the actors in and around the firm and its business with regard to their vested interests in 
the firm. It sees the firm as embedded in a specific legal, economic and political culture, 
herein playing a role as societal actor.92 In contrast to the shareholder approach, this 
perspective takes into account the public services rendered by a large firm in view of 
employment capacities and overall socio-economic spin-off.93 
These two definitions lie at the base of a debate over different patterns of corporate 
organisation, which was for the longest time driven by an almost overwhelming belief 
in what some recognized as nothing less than the ‘end of history in corporate law’94, 
namely the eventual triumph of the shareholder value theory. The present crisis has 
done its part in seriously undermining this credo. However, it is important to emphasize 
that what might be perceived as having been a dispute merely among corporate law 
scholars (and policy makers), had instead long become a forum of much wider impact, 
                                                                                                                                               
737; Dalia Tsuk, 'From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th Century American Legal Thought' 
(2005) 30 Law & Social Inquiry 179; Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, 'Legitimating Power: The Changing Status of the 
Board of Directors' in P Zumbansen and C Williams (eds), The Embedded Firm: Labour, Corporate Governance 
and Finance Capitalism (forthcoming). 
91  Michael C. Jensen, A Theory of the Firm. Governance, Residual Claims, and Organizational Forms (Harvard 
University Press, 2000). 
92  John Parkinson, 'Models of the Company and the Employment Relationship' (2003) 41 British Journal of Indus-
trial Relations 481. 
93  Sanford Jacoby, 'Corporate Governance and Society' (2005) 48 Challenge 69. 
94  Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate Law' (2001) 89 Georgetown Law 
Journal 439. 
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as participants acknowledged the exemplary role of corporate governance for a timely 
and much needed scrutiny and critique of market regulation.95  
II. The Financialization of the Economy and Global Corporate  
Regulatory Reform 
While this dimension of the corporate governance over convergence or divergence can-
not be pursued in this paper96, it continues to form an important background for an as-
sessment of the role of corporate governance in a larger context of market regulation. 
As the following section should make clear, this assessment has more and more become 
one of transgressing national boundaries. Drawing on the observation, for example, by 
the eminent U.S.-American corporate law scholar Melvin Eisenberg of the four ‘essen-
tial modules’ of corporate law, which he identifies as state statutory law, state judge-
made law, federal law and private ordering through soft law,97 it becomes apparent that 
we can no longer limit our perspectives to either traditional (hard-law oriented) or ex-
clusively national processes of rule creation. Instead, rules and standards as developed 
and disseminated by transnational actors such as MNC, stock exchanges whose listing 
rules are of overriding importance for domestic and foreign companies, or International 
Organisations such as the OECD must be seen to form an integral part of the transna-
tional law of corporate governance.98 
Corporate governance codes such as those developed in countries around the world99 
illuminate the significant characteristics of law making processes that have been 
undergoing dramatic changes with regard to the actors involved and the nature of the 
                                                 
95  See e.g. Peter A. Gourevitch and James Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control. The New Global Politics 
of Corporate Governance (Princeton University Press, 2005); Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (eds), Varieties of 
Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, 2001). 
96  But see the contributions in Klaus J. Hopt and others (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance. The State of the 
Art and Emerging Research (Oxford University Press, 1998), and in Jeffrey N. Gordon and Mark J. Roe (eds), 
Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2004); compare with the 
insightful discussion by John W. Cioffi, 'State of the Art: A Review Essay on Comparative Corporate Govern-
ance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research' (2000) 48 American Journal of Comparative Law 501. 
97  Melvin Eisenberg, 'The Architecture of American Corporate Law: Facilitation and Regulation' (2005) 2 Berkeley 
Business Law Journal 167, at 176 
98  See hereto Jennifer Hill, 'Regulatory Show and Tell: Lessons from International Statutory Regimes' (2008) 33 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 819, and Julia Black, 'Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Ac-
countability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes' (2008) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 2/2008 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1091783. 
99  See the list of codes at: http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php (last visited 10 June 2010). 
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norms generated in these processes. These developments have to be placed into the 
wider context of law making reform. In this respect, reform does not only concern 
company law but, more generally involves national, European and international 
attempts to improve law making procedures by allowing for a wider inclusion of private 
actors in rule making procedures.100 What is involved from the point of view of 
democratic theory, is a tension that has long been growing between a functionally 
reduced, rubberstamping parliament on the one hand and a fast moving, hardly 
controllable administration which is in close contact and interaction with private actors, 
on the other.101 At the same time, the currently widespread attempts at improving 
respective national laws on corporate governance and firm organisation102 must be seen 
against the background of an allegedly overwhelming pressure of international 
convergence towards a set of corporate governance principles, most notably established 
in the US and the UK103, an effort that was for years informed by a sense of urgency 
                                                 
100  See, e.g., for the current endeavours on the European level, Kenneth A. Armstrong, 'Civil Society and the White 
Paper - Bridging or Jumping the Gaps?' in C Joerges, Y Meny and JHH Weiler (eds), Mountain or Molehill? A 
Critical Appraisal on the Commission White Paper on Governance (Harvard Law School Jean Monnet Working 
Paper No.6/01, 2001), 99-100: „The normative case for a more autonomised transnational civil society […] lies in 
the inclusion of a new constituency of voices, interests and expertise within élite transnational governance.”; 
Kenneth A. Armstrong, 'Rediscovering Civil Society: The European Union and the White Paper on Governance' 
(2002) 8 European Law Journal 102, 105, qualifyies the reaching out to civil society to be more than just a cure 
of an unsatisfactory supranational parliamentary system, but as reflecting the EU’s development of ‚new forms of 
governance’; cf. the other contributions in 8 ELJ No. 1 (March 2002); with particular emphasis on administrative 
law, see also Carol Harlow, 'European Administrative Law and the Global Challenge' in P Craig and G de Búrca 
(eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press, 1999), placing the analysis of contemporary admin. 
law against the background of ‚a global context’ and a definite tilt from the interventionist to the regulatory state. 
101  For a powerful reconstruction of the pertinent role of the administration in designing rules ‘close to the ground’, 
see the landmark assessment by James W. Landis, The Administrative Process (Yale University Press, 1938). 
102  See, hereto, the contributions in Dieter Feddersen, Peter Hommelhoff and Uwe H. Schneider (eds), Corporate 
Governance. Optimierung der Unternehmensführung und der Unternehmenskontrolle im deutschen und 
amerikanischen Aktienrecht (Otto Schmidt, 1996); Klaus J. Hopt and Eddy Wymeersch, Comparative Corporate 
Governance - Essays and Materials (Walter de Gruyter, 1997); Theodor Baums (ed), Bericht der 
Regierungskommission Corporate Governance. Unternehmensführung, Unternehmenskontrolle, Modernisierung 
des Aktienrechts (Otto Schmidt, 2001), Introduction; see, for a list of worrying items in German corporate 
governance, e.g., Marcus Lutter, 'Die Kontrolle der gesellschaftsrechtlichen Organe: Corporate Governance - ein 
internationales Thema' (2002) 24 Jura 83, at 85. 
103  See, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate Law' (2001) 89 Georgetown 
Law Journal 439; critically Douglas M. Branson, 'The Very Uncertain Prospect of 'Global' Convergence in 
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with regard to adapting stakeholder-oriented, closely knit, bank-financed corporate 
governance systems to an extremely volatile competition for globally available 
investments and is now, at the time of this writing, shaped anew by widespread 
concerns with the consequences and externalities of the finance capitalism of the last 
twenty years. As comparative corporate governance scholars continue to be busied with 
assessments of the post-reform prospects of central building blocks of the different 
regulatory architectures such as the two-tier system of supervisory and management 
board104 in German corporate governance, employee representation105 and the role of 
banks106, we can recently discern a distinct reorientation in focus. On the one hand, there 
                                                                                                                                               
Corporate Governance' (2001) 34 Cornell International Law Journal 321; Sanford M. Jacoby, 'Corporate 
Governance in Comparative Perspective: Prospects for Convergence' (2002, forthcoming) Comparative Labor 
Law & Policy Journal ; see, for an instructive comparison, Steven N. Kaplan, 'Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Performance: A Comparison of Germany, Japan and the U.S.' in KJ Hopt and E Wymeersch (eds), 
Comparative Corporate Governance Essays and Materials (Walter de Gruyter, 1997); Sigurt Vitols, 'Varieties of 
Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany and the UK' in PA Hall and D Soskice (eds), Varieties of 
Capitalism The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, 2001). 
104  See, e.g., Klaus J. Hopt, 'Corporate Governance und deutsche Universalbanken' in D Feddersen, P Hommelhoff 
and UH Schneider (eds), Corporate Governance Optimierung der Unternehmensführung und der 
Unternehmenskontrolle im deutschen und amerikanischen Aktienrecht (Otto Schmidt, 1996), 3, underlining the 
far reaching nexus with the disputed system of co-determination; see also Klaus J. Hopt, 'The German Two-Tier 
Board (Aufsichtsrat): A German View on Corporate Governance' in KJ Hopt and E Wymeersch (eds), 
Comparative Corporate Governance Essays and Materials (Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 10, 17 f.; Peter O. 
Mülbert, 'Bank Equity Holdings in Non-Financial Firms and Corporate Governance: The Case of German 
Universal Banks' in KJ Hopt and others (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance The State of the Art and 
Emerging Research (Oxford University Press, 1998), 362, 364 ff., discussing the claim that the supervisory board 
had traditionally been weakened in order to refrain employees’ influence within the firm. 
105  Thomas Raiser, 'The Theory of Enterprise Law in the Federal Republic of Germany' (1988) 36 American Journal 
of Comparative Law 111, 114; Katharina Pistor, 'Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Ex-
ternalities' in M Blair and MJ Roe (eds), Employees and Corporate Governance (Brookings Institution, 1999); 
Jean du Plessis and Otto Sandrock, 'The German System of Supervisory Codetermination by Employees' in JJ du 
Plessis and others (eds), German Corporate Governance in International and European Context (Springer, 2007). 
106  See, e.g, Klaus J. Hopt, 'Corporate Governance und deutsche Universalbanken' in D Feddersen, P Hommelhoff 
and UH Schneider (eds), Corporate Governance Optimierung der Unternehmensführung und der 
Unternehmenskontrolle im deutschen und amerikanischen Aktienrecht (Otto Schmidt, 1996), 246, rejecting the 
commonly made claim of strongest, intimate ties between German firms and their “Hausbanken”; see also 
Theodor Baums, 'Corporate Governance in Germany - System and Recent Developments' in M Isaksson and R 
Skog (eds), Aspects of Corporate Governance (Juristförlaget, 1994), 31 ff.; Peter O. Mülbert, 'Bank Equity 
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can be no doubt that the intermittently lively interest in comparative corporate 
governance, convergence or divergence and the alleged triumph of shareholder primacy 
has given way to a considerably more sober look at how we arrived in the present crisis. 
A new excellent study on the comparative evolution of U.S. and German corporate 
governance frames its conceptual orientation as well as the concluding analysis firmly 
in the context of the present financial crisis.107 This sensitivity to timeliness, however, is 
anything but coincidental. Instead, it is owed to the ‘financialisation’ of the corporation 
and the far-reaching overtaking of corporate law by corporate finance concepts, that has 
marked the last twenty years of corporate governance reform, which seem to have been 
firmly steeped in the belief of adapting the business corporation to the dynamics of 
global capital markets.108 To be sure, this reform orientation can be read as one possible 
reaction to the deep-running transformation of Western welfare states, to the erosion of 
social security and the breaking-up of embedded, long-grown business-finance 
networks that shaped, for example, the stunning success of ‘Germany Inc.’ At the same 
time, however, the financialisation of the global economy and the rise of shareholder 
value as the dominant paradigm in corporate governance marked a distinct adoption of a 
narrow and reductionist conception of the firm. As we are now witnessing a global 
introspection into the causes of the crisis, there is an important opportunity to revisit the 
recent trajectory of corporate governance reform in light of the dire consequences of the 
exuberrant subjection of the business corporation to the insatiable appetite of capital 
markets.109 The promising prospects of the current crisis are the emerging opportunities 
to see beyond singular stories of outrageous, scandalous conduct in order to take into 
view the connections between pursued policies and market outcomes. As John 
Braithwaite noted recently, “The ritual for blaming someone for failures that are system 
failures is ritualistic in the sense that it seeks to calm critics by giving them a fall guy to 
chew on instead of fixing the problem.”110 
                                                                                                                                               
Holdings in Non-Financial Firms and Corporate Governance: The Case of German Universal Banks' in KJ Hopt 
and others (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance The State of the Art and Emerging Research (Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 447 ff. 
107  John W. Cioffi, Public Law and Private Power: Corporate Governance Reform in the United States and Ger-
many in an Age of Finance Capitalism (Cornell University Press, forthcoming). 
108  Ronald Dore, 'Financialization of the Global Economy' (2008) 17 Industrial and Corporate Change 1097; Ewald 
Engelen, 'The Case for Financialization' (2008) 12 Competition and Change 111. 
109  See e.g. the contributions to P Zumbansen/C Williams (eds.), The Embedded Firm: Corporate Governance, La-
bour and Financial Capitalism (forthcoming). 
110  John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism. How it Works, Ideas for Making it Work Better (Edward Elgar, 2008), 
150. 
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These connections can no longer solely be studied within contained, embedded 
systems of national political economies. Instead, there is a growing awareness of the 
fact that the adaptations of historically evolved governance systems display a particular 
transnational dimension. In light of the globally intertwined business and interaction 
among firms created under different legal rules, corporate governance rules have 
increasingly become a competitive asset on a ‘law market’111, a market, however, that is 
not only constituted by sovereign sellers with vested authority in the creation of binding 
legal norms, but by an amalgamation of national governments, supranational norm 
setting institutions such as the OECD or the UN Global Compact as well as a private 
parties such as multinational corporations and interest group representations. This 
particularly global regulatory landscape has not failed to capture the imagination of 
scholars of comparative law112, regulatory theory113 and institutional analysis.114 So, 
while the current crisis must rightly be perceived as a failure of regulation and state 
action115, it can no longer be denied that reactions to the crisis, including the calls for 
‘tougher regulation’ as recently promulgated by political leaders around the world, will 
unfold in a tightly intervowen space of governmental collaboration and interaction.116 In 
the field of corporate governance the landscape is not only populated by national 
governments eagerly engaged in a headstrong pursuit of regulatory reform; 
complementing such efforts is a vast proliferation of private and mixed public/private, 
hybrid processes of rule making cutting across jurisdictional boundaries and 
contributing to an increasingly densely woven net of guidelines, best practices, and 
standards. The defining feature of the emerging transnational body of corporate govern-
ance norms is the intricate resurfacing of a series of paradoxes pertaining to the insepa-
rability of substantive/procedural, coordinative/regulatory and authority/affectedness 
aspects of the norms in question. In order to illustrate the theoretical challenge facing 
any legal theory that wishes to explain the norm creation dynamics in this area, our 
analysis cannot be confined to the substantive law governing specific forms of societal 
activity, which has long remained the hallmark of comparative work in the law of cor-
                                                 
111  Erin A. O'Hara and Larry E. Ribstein, The Law Market (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
112  Jennifer Hill, 'Regulatory Show and Tell: Lessons from International Statutory Regimes' (2008) 33 Delaware 
Journal of Corporate Law 819. 
113  Julia Black and David Rouch, 'The development of global markets as rule-makers: engagement and legitimacy' 
(2008) Law and Financial Markets Review 218. 
114  See e.g. the recent monographical study by Andreas Busch, Banking Regulation and Globalization (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2009) with case studies on the U.S., Germany, the UK and Switzerland. 
115  Busch, preceding note; Cioffi (2009), above. 
116  Howard Davies and David Green, Global Financial Regulation. The Essential Guide (Polity, 2008). 
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porate governance117; rather, our attention has to turn as well to the dynamics that are 
unfolding between different levels and sites of rule making from a regulatory perspec-
tive. From this combined perspective, the law of corporate governance becomes a prime 
example of a transnational law regime. The intricate embeddedness of regulatory inno-
vation in locally defined governance structures on the one hand, and their integration in 
transnationally unfolding rule making processes is characteristic of the current regula-
tory landscape in corporate governance, as illustrated by the particular dynamics of cor-
porate governance codes. From this perspective, codes are a powerful example of the 
way in which private ordering maintains an intricately challenging tension with the in-
stitutional frameworks for official law making. 
III. Law Making in Corporate Governance: The Example of the German 
Corporate Governance Code 
On June 21, 2002, the German chamber of federal states („Länder”), the Bundesrat, 
approved of a bill which had prior to that passed the national parliament („Bundestag”), 
and which introduced a number of substantial changes to the German Aktiengesetz 
[Stock Corporation Act].118 This particular statute had to a large degree been 
contemplated and prepared under the auspices of two specially formed governmental 
commissions concerned with a reform of German corporate governance. The second of 
these commissions, the so-called ‘Corporate Governance Code-Commission’, had been 
convened with the mandate of taking up the suggestions of the first commission, central 
to which was the drafting of a voluntary Code of Corporate Governance Rules. This 
second commission was chaired by Mr Gerhard Cromme, Spokesman of the 
supervisory’s board of German steel manufacturer ThyssenKrupp,119 who presented its 
work on 26 February 2002 to the Ministry of Justice.120 
Among the many interesting features of the German Corporate Governance Code, 
which a renowned German corporate governance scholar coined a ‘novum’ in the 
                                                 
117  See the excellent study by Detlev Vagts, 'Reforming the 'Modern Corporation': Perspectives from the German' 
(1966) 80 Harvard Law Review 23. 
118  See the Gesetz zur weiteren Reform des Aktien- und Bilanzrechts, zu Transparenz und Publizität (Transparenz- 
und Publizitätsgesetz – abbr. TraPuG) [Transparency and Disclosure Act], adopted by the German Bundestag on 
May 17, 2002. See also the documentation in Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG), 2002, 78-81, and the 
comprehensive presentation of the TraPuG’s main elements by Heribert Hirte, Das Transparenz- und 
Publizitätsgesetz (Beck, 2003). 
119  See the relevant information on the Commission at: http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/index-e.html. 
120  See press release at: http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/news/presse-20020226.html. 
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system of German legal sources121, is its intricate and still largely unresolved legal 
nature.122 The following section will approach a possible answer to this question in the 
larger context of corporate governance reform as it has been pursued on the domestic, 
European and transnational levels on the one hand and of a distinctly legal sociological 
perspective under the proposed heading of ‘transnational legal pluralism’, on the 
other.123 
Ever since the time of its publication in 2002, the German Corporate Governance 
Code has prompted a vivid debate about its legal or, perhaps, non-legal nature, with 
assessments ranging from ‘soft law’124 to ‘unconstitutional’.125 That this debate has still 
not subsided126 might be explained in light of the particular novelty that the arrival of the 
idea of a code constituted in Germany.127 At the same time, its creation could be seen as 
having been partaking in a worldwide surge of the drafting and promulgating of 
corporate governance codes.128, but also the Code’s rather straight-forward normative 
design. The Code itself includes those norms and regulations that are mandatory 
corporate law rules which are already set out in the German Stock Corporation Law. 
                                                 
121  Peter Ulmer, 'Der deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex - ein neues Regulierungsinstrument für börsennotierte 
Aktiengesellschaften' (2002) 166 ZHR 150, 152. 
122  Eberhard Vetter, 'Der Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex nur ein zahnloser Tiger? Zur Bedeutung von § 161 
AktG für Beschlüsse der Hauptversammlung' (2008) Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 121, 121: 
„still not resolved satisfyingly“. 
123  See already Peer Zumbansen, ''New Governance' in European Corporate Governance Regulation as Transnational 
Legal Pluralism' (2008b) 15 European Law Journal 246, and Peer Zumbansen, 'Spaces and Places: A Systems 
Theory Approach to Regulatory Competition in European Company Law' (2006) 12 European Law Journal 534. 
124  Marcus Lutter, 'Vergleichende Cororate Governance - Die deutsche Sicht' (2001) 30 European Company Law 
Review [ECLR - ZGR] 224, 225; critically hereto: Ulmer (2002), above, 161. 
125  Wolfgang Seidel, 'Kodex ohne Rechtsgrundlage' (2004) Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 1095. 
126  See e.g. Jean du Plessis and Ingo Sanger, 'An Overview of the Corporate Governance Debate in Germany' in JJ 
du Plessis and others (eds), German Corporate Governance in International and European Context (Springer, 
2007), 31: “serious concerns with regard to the constitutionality of the Code.” 
127  Axel von Werder, 'Preamble to the Commentary on the German Corporate Governance Code, 3rd ed.' in H-M 
Ringleb and others (eds), Kommentar zum Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex Kodex-Kommentar (3rd ed) 
(CH Beck, 2008), 15, annotation 6. 
128  See e.g. Axel von Werder, 'Preamble to the Commentary on the German Corporate Governance Code, 3rd ed.' in 
H-M Ringleb and others (eds), Kommentar zum Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex Kodex-Kommentar 
(3rd ed) (CH Beck, 2008), who situates the creation of the German Code within the larger context of a veritable 
‘international code movement’, id. at 14. See also the list of corporate governance codes listed on the website of 
the European Corporate Governance Institute (http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php) 
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The Code’s purpose, according to its Drafters, in reiterating these norms here is to 
provide foreign investors with a transparent and simple introduction to central rules 
pertinent to the corporate governance rules existing in Germany.129 Furthermore, the 
Code includes recommendations, which are expressed by the word “sollen” (shall) and 
the observation of which is to be made transparent in an annual statement made by the 
firm’s management.130 Lastly, the Code contains suggestions as to corporate conduct the 
observation of which is merely ‘suggested’ but there is no obligation to disclose 
whether a company has followed these suggestions.131 The ‚comply or disclose’ 
principle which is endorsed in the Code with regard to “recommendations” has been 
seen as an indirect enforceability anchor in the Code, whereby it could be seen to lose 
its genuinely voluntary character.132 That the Code in fact attains an at least indirect 
mandatory character, is strengthened by the enactment of Section 161 in the German 
Stock Corporation Act (AktG), whereby the legislature actually introduced the 
disclosure duty into codified law.133 But, does this suffice to make the Code a piece of 
enforceable legislation? Others have argued, that even if there is a disclosure obligation 
with regard to the company’s compliance with the Code’s recommendations, it would 
be wrong to perceive the Code itself as ‘law’. The latter, so it was argued134, would only 
                                                 
129  German Corporate Governance Code, Foreword, http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/kodex/1.html: 
“This German Corporate Governance Code (the "Code") presents essential statutory regulations for the manage-
ment and supervision (governance) of German listed companies and contains internationally and nationally rec-
ognized standards for good and responsible governance. The Code aims at making the German Corporate Gov-
ernance system transparent and understandable. Its purpose is to promote the trust of international and national 
investors, customers, employees and the general public in the management and supervision of listed German 
stock corporations.” 
130  See the German Corporate Governance Code, Preface, 2, available at http://www.corporate-governance-
code.de/index-e.html. 
131  Id. 
132  Wolfgang Seidel, 'Der Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex - eine private oder doch eine staatliche Regelung?' 
(2004) 25 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 285; Wolfgang Seidel, 'Kodex ohne Rechtsgrundlage' (2004) 
Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 1095; Markus Heintzen, 'Der Deutsche Corporate Governance Ko-
dex aus der Sicht des deutschen Verfassungsrechts' (2004) 25 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 1933 
133  See, supra. The quality and assessment of this obligatory annual ‘explanation’ must certainly be disputed, see, 
e.g., Martin Peltzer, 'Handlungsbedarf in Sachen Corporate Governance' (2002) Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 593, 594; regrettably, the just published, leading commentary on German stock 
corporation law, by Uwe hüffer, remains silent on this new codification, see Uwe Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (5. Aufl. 
edn C.H.Beck, 2002), § 161 AktG. 
134  Henrik-Michael Ringleb, Introduction, in: Henrik-Michael Ringleb and others, Kommentar zum Deutschen Cor-
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then be the case, if the recommendations themselves were being made obligatory which, 
arguably, they are not.135 These opposed viewpoints illustrate the underlying central 
difficulty: It is clear, that the Code’s practical relevance is to be seen in its effect on the 
actual behaviour of firms136, something which appears to have constinuously accrued 
with each passing year.137 Whether or not firms do comply with the code’s dispositions 
relating, eg, to transparency and disclosure of executive compensation138 (a part of the 
Kodex that spurred concrete legislative action leading up to the entering into force of a 
federal statute on the adequacy of executive compensation in August 2009139), the 
publication of the firm’s reports on the Internet140, or the facilitating of personal exercise 
of shareholders’ voting rights141 will, according to the rules established by the Code, 
remain within the discretion of the company.142 Again, the Code explicitly foresees that 
companies do not have to comply with ‘recommendations’. And yet they are obliged – 
under Section 161 AktG – to issue an annual explanation whether or not they did 
comply.143 The annual monitoring of the Code’s ‘acceptance’ has revealed consistently 
growing numbers of German major corporations to observe the Code.144 
A systematic interpretation alone of the Code’s three-fold structure with information, 
recommendations and suggestions, which would aim at determining the legal nature of 
                                                                                                                                               
porate Governance Kodex [Kodex-Kommentar] (C.H.Beck, 2nd ed., 2005); Axel von Werder, 'Der Deutsche 
Corporate Governance-Kodex - Grundlagen und Einzelbestimmungen' (2002) 55 Der Betrieb 801; Christoph H. 
Seibt, 'Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex und Entsprechenserklärung (§ 161 AktG-E)' (2002) 47 Die Akti-
engesellschaft (AG) 249. 
135  Marcus Lutter, 'Die Kontrolle der gesellschaftsrechtlichen Organe: Corporate Governance - ein internationales 
Thema' (2002) 24 Jura 83, 86, with regard to informations and suggestions. 
136  Christoph H. Seibt, 'Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex: Antworten auf Zweifelsfragen der Praxis' (2003) 
48 Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 465. 
137  Jürgen van Kann and Mira Eigler, 'Aktuelle Neuerungen des Corporate Governance Kodex' (2007) Deutsche 
Zeitschrift für Steuerrecht 1730, 1733. 
138  Very critically hereto Martin Wolf, 'Corporate Governance. Der Import angelsächsicher "Self-Regulation" im 
Widerstreit zum deutschen Parlamentsvorbehalt' (2002) 35 Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (ZRP) 59, 60. 
139  See Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung – VorstAG); full text at: http://www.bmj.de/files/ 
7db813ef5ce3522d02ef3547a4c2f341/3836/gesetz_vorstandsverguetung_VorstAG.pdf. 
140  See e.g., Section 2.3.1 of the Cromme’s commission’s German Corporate Governance Code. 
141  German Corporate Governance Code, Section 2.3.3. 
142  German Corporate Governance Code, Section 1: Foreword, differentiating between voluntary recommendations 
(“shall”), suggestions (“should”, “can”), and legally compelling provisions, according to existing law. 
143  See Section 16 Transparency and Disclosure Act. 
144  Van Kann & Eigler (2007), above, 1733. 
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each of the Code’s components in concert with the others and, lastly, within the general 
structure of the Code, does not appear to yield a clear-cut result. While the merely 
informative sections on the one hand and the suggestions on the other can remain 
outside the gambit of such a line of inquiry, the Code’s recommendations invite further 
inspection. The mentioned disclosure obligation is in itself intriguing, if not 
problematic145: While identifying criminal sanctions against the disclosing director in 
the case of an incorrect declaration (Section 400 AktG), neither the Statute nor the Code 
contains any means of how such incorrectness should be ascertained. This can be 
interpreted as meaning that the legislator could not wish to or did not imagine how to 
put in place a tight monitoring system that goes beyond the registration of whether the 
declaration has been made at all, the failure of which is sanctioned in the 
Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB - Commercial Code). What is likely, then, is that the 
legislator, keeping in line with the regulatory spirit of the Code itself, did in turn aim at 
inducing an indirect enforcement mechanism into the law, the functionality of which, 
however, is unfolding entirely outside of the statutory realm. Where companies would 
fail to correctly disclose their compliance or non-compliance, so it might be argued, the 
market, that is the investors, will adequately act on this communication. Surely, such a 
perspective is not without problems: even if in theory the market were to react to an 
incorrectly or not at all issued declaration by devaluing the company’s shares, there 
would still remain considerable burden of proof challenges to establish liability.146 
Rejecting as well a number of other legal grounds for liability due to the legal – non-
binding – nature of the Code147, the effect of Section 161 would merely be the initiation 
of a shaming process, playing out on a market for reputation. From this perspective, 
however, it remains doubtful, how the Stock Corporation Act, a statutory public norm, 
which commands a private actor, here a stock corporation, to annually disclose whether 
it has complied with a non-binding set of recommendations, can be compatible with an 
enforcement processs through shaming, which unfolds outside of the state. 
But, perhaps, this perspective is inadequate to capture the particular combination of 
coordinative/regulatory dimensions reflected in the Code. The preceding discussion 
suggests how our conceptualisation of the enforcement qualities of the Corporate Go-
vernance Code is informed by our understanding of the distinction between a statutory 
                                                 
145  For a list of the extensive, even monographical literature on this provision, see Gerald Spindler, 'Commentary to 
§ 161 AktG' in K Schmidt and M Lutter (eds), Aktiengesetz Kommentar (Otto Schmidt, 2008), before annota-
tion 1. 
146  Gerald Spindler, 'Commentary to § 161 AktG' in K Schmidt and M Lutter (eds), Aktiengesetz Kommentar (Otto 
Schmidt, 2008), annotation 63. 
147  Spindler (2008), above, annotations 63-77. 
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norm of law set by the state on the one hand and a non-binding norm of non-law on the 
other. The linkage between law and non-law as it is being established by Section 161 
leads us to further entrench this unquestioned distinction where, perhaps, we should 
recognise that it was an inappropriate one to begin with. Whether or not the Code is 
law, might not be answerable with regard to its enforcement mechanism, but perhaps 
better with view to its authorship. It is here, where the relevance of the above proposed 
RCRC model to depict such incremental ways of rule making becomes central. We will 
lay this out in detail in the following section. 
1. Who – Really – Makes Company Law? 
If the answer whether or not a norm is to be recognised as law, depends on the 
authoritative process to enact legal norms, then a closer look must be taken at the 
process through which the Corporate Governance Code was enacted. Under German 
constitutional law, the right to initiate legislative proposals lies with the government and 
with the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, the federal parliament and the representation of 
the Federal states respectively.148 This in fact was the starting observation of those 
scholars who are opposed to any norm-making by private expert groups. These scholars 
identified instances where a government seeks societal approval for envisioned 
legislative projects from private interest groups as examples of an on-going and 
proliferating ‘deparlamentarisation’.149 Their critique was directed, in particular, against 
the norm-production by societal groups such as expert groups, commissions or 
associations the work of which is at times based on an ambivalent forms of public 
authorisation.150 
This skepticism, however, appears overdrawn, by many accounts. First of all, it has 
long been recognised by adminstrative and constitutional law scholars, that the state is 
highly dependent on the expert input from societal actors in carrying out its legislative 
                                                 
148  See, Art. 76 para. 2 Grundgesetz (German Basic Law), available at: http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/gm00000_ 
.html (27 July 2006). 
149  See, Martin Wolf, 'Corporate Governance. Der Import angelsächsicher "Self-Regulation" im Widerstreit zum 
deutschen Parlamentsvorbehalt' (2002) 35 Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (ZRP) 59, and Paul Kirchhof, 'Demokratie 
ohne parlamentarische Gesetzgebung?' (2001) 54 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1332; Paul Kirchhof, 
'Gesetzgebung und private Regelsetzung als Geltungsgrund für Rechnungslegungspflichten?' (2000) 29 
Zeitschrift für Unternehmensrecht [ZGR] 681, 690. 
150  Kirchhof, Demokratie ohne parlamentarischen Gesetzgeber (2001), above, arguing that parliaments, nut not such 
private commissions are mandated to produce legal norms; see also Wolfgang Seidel, 'Kodex ohne Rechtsgrund-
lage' (2004) Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 1095, arguing that the Code remains a public norm, 
which was drafted without proper law-making authority. 
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and administrative functions.151 Furthermore, it is clear that with the growing 
complexity of societal relations and, correspondingly, a growing demand for 
sophisticated and context-sensitive public governance forms152, any form of norm-
production and implementation has become an extremely fragile process of risk-taking 
and of trial-and-error. In the light of the particular governance challenges arising in 
contemporary, complex societies153, an allegedly clear-cut distinction between public 
and private governance schemes, built on the image of a sovereign, knowlegdable state 
presiding over a fragmented, market-society, would fail to grasp the intricate forms of 
public-private governance mechanisms, of knowledge sharing and experimental politics 
that characterise contemporary law making.154 In this light, the insistence on the state 
keeping a safe distance from private knowledge, bears little explanatory value for our 
understanding of contemporary forms of governance. 
The second strand of critique mounted against corporate governance codes and the 
associated form of private law making targeted the real effect emanating from such 
codes and practices. Given the already alluded-to complex regulatory nature of the 
Code, it is not surprising that it met with severe critique regarding its purportedly absent 
legislative authoritarial basis.155 While some expressed their support of this form of 
                                                 
151  See already Richard B. Stewart, 'The Reformation of American Administrative Law' (1975) 88 Harvard Law 
Review 1669; Jody Freeman, 'Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State' (1997) 45 University of Cali-
fornia at Los Angeles Law Review 1. 
152  Gunther Teubner, 'Juridification - Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions' in G Teubner (ed) Juridification of Social 
Spheres (Walter de Gruyter, 1987); Karl-Heinz Ladeur, 'The Theory of Autopoiesis as an Approach to a Better 
Understanding of Postmodern Law' (1999) EUI Working Paper Law No 99/3  
153  See only Ulrich Beck, 'From Industrial Society to Risk Society: Questions of Survival, Social Structure and Eco-
logical Enlightenment' (1992) 9 Theory, Culture & Society 97. 
154  See, eg, Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (Oxford University Press, 1997); Michael 
Power, 'Enterprise Risk Management and the Organization of Uncertainty in Financial Institutions' in KK Cetina 
and A Preda (eds), The Sociology of Financial Markets (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
155  See Wolfgang Seidel, 'Der Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex - eine private oder doch eine staatliche Rege-
lung?' (2004) 25 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 285; Paul Kirchhof, 'Das Parlament als Mitte der Demo-
kratie' in PM Huber, M Brenner and M Möstl (eds), Der Staat des Grundgesetzes - Kontinuität und Wandel Fest-
schrift für Peter Badura zum 70 Geburtstag (Mohr Siebeck, 2004); Ulrich Noack, 'Neuerungen im Recht der 
Hauptversammlung durch das Transparenz- und Publizitätsgesetz und den Deutschen Corporate Governance 
Kodex' (2002) 55 Der Betrieb [DB] 620, 620, calling the Code drafted by the Cromme-Commission, ‘a peculiar 
set of rules’ (“ein Regelwerk von eigenartiger Gestalt”); Martin Peltzer, 'Handlungsbedarf in Sachen Corporate 
Governance' (2002) Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 593, 593, highlights the fact that the the Code 
has been drafted without a legislative authorization nor democratic legitimization; see, even more polemically, 
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installing a forum in order to solicit dispersed and urgently needed expertise, feeding 
into concrete law making proposals for the Federal legislature,156 others pointed to 
various drawbacks of this particular form of law making.157 One of the main contentions 
concerned the alleged ‘exclusion’ of the parliament from the actual process of 
conceptualizing and preparing of the legislative proposal.158 In this respect, it was 
alleged that the soliciting of experts into the open parliamentary arena would make the 
law’s genesis more transparent and, ultimately, render it more legitimate.159 Another 
critical issue concerned the fundamental question whether or not a private body of 
experts is or should in fact be entitled and authorised to draw up binding law.160 
This critique mounted against ‚private’ law making bodies such as the two recent 
government commissions on corporate governance is not so easily refuted. The core 
issue appears to be whether or not privately enacted norms may be given binding effect 
towards third parties to the norm generation. While an intuitive answer would suggest a 
clear “no”, the matter at stake here does indeed escape such a straight-forward 
assessment. While it is a common place in private law that contractual obligations 
concern foremost and only the contracting parties161, we have been witnessing a decisive 
                                                                                                                                               
Paul Kirchhof, 'Demokratie ohne parlamentarische Gesetzgebung?' (2001) 54 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
(NJW) 1332. 
156  See, eg, Theodor Baums, 'Interview: Reforming German Corporate Governance: Inside a Law Making Process of 
a Very New Nature' (2001) 2 German Law Journal at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=43. 
157  See, eg, Martin Wolf, 'Corporate Governance. Der Import angelsächsicher "Self-Regulation" im Widerstreit zum 
deutschen Parlamentsvorbehalt' (2002) 35 Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (ZRP) 59, 59, 60; in the same vein Paul 
Kirchhof, 'Demokratie ohne parlamentarische Gesetzgebung?' (2001) 54 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 
1332, 1332, 1333, critically observing a ‚deparlamentarization’ (Entparlamentisierung) both with regard to the 
EU’s (i.e. the Council’s) appropriation of law making sectors formerly reserved by the Member States and the 
executive’s practice on the national level of seeking consensus with market players before pushing this consensus 
through the parliament; see already idem., ZGR 2000, 609; for a thorough discussion of private law making, See 
Ferdinand Kirchhof, Private Rechtsetzung (Duncker & Humblot, 1987); in the U.S. American context, the 
canonical text is Louis Jaffe, 'Law Making by Private Groups' (1937) 51 Harvard Law Review 201, 1 ff.; see also 
Freeman, Symposium: The Contracting State; idem., The Private Role in Public Government. 
158  See, Martin Wolf, 'Corporate Governance. Der Import angelsächsicher "Self-Regulation" im Widerstreit zum 
deutschen Parlamentsvorbehalt' (2002) 35 Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (ZRP) 59, Paul Kirchhof, 'Demokratie 
ohne parlamentarische Gesetzgebung?' (2001) 54 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1332. 
159  Id. 
160  Id. 
161  See, e.g., Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford University Press, 1999), 23; Michael Bäuerle, 
Vertragsfreiheit und Grundgesetz. Normativität und Faktizität individueller Vertragsfreiheit in verfassungs-
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evolutionary development in the public (constitutional) governance of private contract 
law towards a recognition of the larger social role played by private transactions.162 
Indeed, it is a frequent element of private law arrangements, that contracts between two 
(or more) parties have effects upon third parties to the contractual agreement.163 And 
yet, the here suggested connection between contractual ‘private ordering’ and the norm 
setting by commissions might, however, be misleading. As we have seen, it is not 
entirely clear, whether or not the commissions are in fact ‘private’ by nature. This can 
be doubted at least in those cases where government officials are participating in the 
commission’s work, such as was the case in the first Commission of 2000-2001.164 
                                                                                                                                               
rechtlicher Perspektive (Nomos, 2001), 65, describing the different ordering function of private (contract) law 
and public (administrative) law; see also Murray Hunt, 'Constitutionalism and the Contractualisation of 
Government in the United Kingdom' in M Taggart (ed) The Province of Administrative Law (Hart Publishing, 
1997), 38, recognizing both the need and the emergence of a ‚modern conception of constitutionalism’, which 
reaches beyond a strictly parliamentarian vision of law making; see also Martin Peltzer, 'Corporate Governance 
Codices als zusätzliche Pflichtenbestimmung für den Aufsichtsrat' (2002) 5 Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 10, 11. 
162  See, hereto, Murray Hunt, 'Constitutionalism and the Contractualisation of Government in the United Kingdom' 
in M Taggart (ed) The Province of Administrative Law (Hart Publishing, 1997); Hugh Collins, Regulating 
Contracts (Oxford University Press, 1999), 46 ff.; Michael Bäuerle, Vertragsfreiheit und Grundgesetz. 
Normativität und Faktizität individueller Vertragsfreiheit in verfassungsrechtlicher Perspektive (Nomos, 2001), 
121, 123 ff.; Dieter Hart, 'Einleitung vor §§ 116 ff. BGB' in R Wassermann (ed) Alternativkommentar BGB, 1 
Band (Luchterhand, 1987); Dieter Hart, 'Zur konzeptionellen Entwicklung des Vertragsrechts' (1984) 29 Die 
Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 66; see Hestermeyer, Report on the BGH’s Jurisprudence in Private Law, in: The Annual 
of German & European Law (R Miller/P Zumbansen eds., Berghahn: Oxford/New York 2004), Section C II. 
163  See, eg, the jurisprudence of the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH - Federal Court of Justice) concerning third party 
effects of expert testimony contracts: BGH, JZ 2000, p. 725; earlier BGH, in: NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 
(NJW) 1979, p. 1595; BGH, in NJW 1982, p. 2431, and BGH, in NJW 1984, p. 355; BGHZ 127, 378; BGHZ 
138, 157; see also BGHZ 133, 168; for a discussion of this jurisprudence, see Basil Markesinis and Hannes 
Unberath, The German Law of Torts, 5th Ed. (Hart Publishing, 2002), pp. 265-288; Peer Zumbansen, 
'Drittschützende Wirkung eines Anwaltvertrages und verdeckte Sacheinlage' (2000) 55 Juristenzeitung (JZ) 442; 
see already Friedrich Kessler, 'Die soziale Funktion des Vertrages zugunsten Dritter' in K Müller and H Soell 
(eds), Rechtswissenschaft und Gesetzgebung Festschrift für Eduard Wahl zum siebzigsten Geburtstag (Carl 
Winter Universitätsverlag, 1973); see also Marc Amstutz, 'The Constitution of Contractual Networks' in M 
Amstutz and G Teubner (eds), Networks Legal Issues of Multilateral Co-operation (Hart Publishing, 2009). 
164  See, Report of the (First) Government Commission Corporate Governance, chaired by Professor Theodor Baums, 
section B. 
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While the Code commission165 was made up only of private actors, ie representatives of 
large firms or academic institutions, the Commission’s personnel might also not entirely 
provide the answer to the question as to whether any of these commissions is furnished 
with the proper competence to enact binding law. More importantly, then, is the nature 
of the Commission’s empanneling. Where the  Commission is convened upon the 
initiative and request by the government, there is indeed considerable reason to qualify 
it to be more ‘public’ in nature than if it were upon the initiative of a commercial actor, 
such as a bank or another private interest group.166 
After the preceding discussion, we are likely to still feel unsatisfied with an 
ultimately inconclusive attempt at answering the question regarding the Code’s legal 
nature with regard to the constitution of the drafting Commission. The result, however, 
we suggest, was entirely predictable if not inevitable, given the starting premises. If 
anything, this discussion has begun to illustrate the inadequacy of the public/private 
distinction to capture what we have in Chapter 2 referred to as the paradoxical 
constitution of transnational law making. In the following section, we will further 
explain the inadequacy of the attempt to explain the legal nature of the Code through a 
designation of its norms or its authors as either public or private. 
2. Corporate Law Making Between State and Society 
The discussion of the rise of governance in contemporary law making reflects a wide-
ranging interest, but also a high level of concern with what is being perceived as a 
‘privatisation of law’.167 As Colin Scott recently noted: “…recognition of private 
legislation reflects both a desire to better understand the diffuse nature of capacities 
underpinning regulatory and wider governance practices and a concern respecting the 
legitimacy of such non-governmental rule making.”168 This combination of ‘desire’ and 
                                                 
165  See, Martin Wolf, 'Corporate Governance. Der Import angelsächsicher "Self-Regulation" im Widerstreit zum 
deutschen Parlamentsvorbehalt' (2002) 35 Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (ZRP) 59, p. 59 note 3; see the list of 
members of the (Second) Government Commission Corporate Governance, chaired by Dr. Gerhard Cromme, 
available at:  http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/mitglieder/index.html (27 July 2006); See the Code 
at: http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/download/CorGov_Endfassung_E.pdf (27 July 2006). 
166  Latter examples include the code commissions for the Deutsche Bank, the ‘Berliner Initiativkreis’ and the 
‘Frankfurt Commission’, all mentioned in Martin Peltzer, 'Corporate Governance Codices als zusätzliche 
Pflichtenbestimmung für den Aufsichtsrat' (2002) 5 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 10, at 11. 
167  See the survey by Johannes Köndgen, 'Privatisierung des Rechts. Private Governance zwischen Deregulierung 
und Rekonstitutionalisierung' (2006) 206 Archiv für die cilivilistische Praxis [AcP] 477. 
168  Colin Scott, 'Regulating private legislation' in F Cafaggi and H Muir-Watt (eds), Making European Law Govern-
ance Design (Edward Elgar, 2008), 254. 
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‘concern’ originates from a persisting association of law and its creation with the public, 
state sphere, while informal and private ordering remains relegated to the private, 
market realm. Central to our analysis up to this point was an argument against this 
dualistic distinction, which is inadequate to grasp the ways in which both hybrid and 
private forms of norm generation can produce norms with regulatory functions. In 
concluding this section on corporate governance codes, it is time to draw out the context 
in which this hybrid law making occurs, a context which is both ‘real’, that is consisting 
of actors, and conceptual, meaning that it at the same time a particular, methdological 
reflection on the way that norms are being created in such areas today. 
IV. Corporate Governance and the Intricacies of Rough Consensus and 
Running Code 
The example of the German Corporate Governance Code illustrates this particular 
approach, which Gralf Calliess and I have been conceptualizing as Rough Consensus 
and Running Code [RCRC]169, in the following way. The German government, facing 
immense domestic and international pressure to reform its corporate law regime so as to 
make German companies more attractive for global investors, was aware of the reform 
obstacles existing in the contemporary German political economy. At the same time, the 
government was well aware of the potential of societal (‘market’) self-regulation, as 
was declared by the Ministry of Justice at the occasion of being presented with the 
Commission’s Corporate Governance Code in February 2002. Furthermore, the German 
government was hardly taking a revolutionary step when inviting a Commission to draft 
this instrument. Even if the legislative project of drafting a national civil code in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century was of course in many ways different to the drafting 
of the Corporate Governance Code in 2002, the Schröder government’s initiation of the 
Commission, which was markedly referred to as a ‘Government Commission’, also 
bears some important resemblances to its historical forerunner. In both instances, the 
government drew on private expert knowledge in preparing a comprehensive legislative 
instrument, the regulatory impact of which was perceived as being so large that its 
delegation to a commission of experts promised to channel otherwise conflicting and 
perhaps irresolvable positions through a discursive, outcome-oriented process. 
Certainly, the government’s initiation of this norm-generation process remained 
ambivalent at best with regard to the legal nature of the Code growing out of the 
commission’s work. The striking characteristic of both the process of the Code’s 
drafting and of the Code itself remains, it seems, its hybrid nature between a non-
                                                 
169  Gralf-Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of Transnational 
Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2010). 
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binding, voluntary, ‘private’ regulatory instrument on the one hand and a document, 
linked to a statutory disclosure obligation by a federal law, on the other. Yet, neither 
dimension adequately depicts the dynamics that shape the emergence of the idea of a 
Code, the evolution of its drafting, the intriguingly open-ended nature of the discussion 
around the legal nature of both the norms of the Code as of the Code itself. Instead, the 
discussion has made it clear that the repeated attempts to solve this mystery by 
effectively avoiding the question ‘public’ or ‘private’ through designating the Code as 
hybrid and by referring to its norms as ‘soft law’, achieves just that, namely to avoid the 
underlying conundrum of how to integrate such governance processes into our legal 
theoretical methodology and doctrine. This, then, makes the example of the German 
Corporate Governance Code particularly intriguing because its coming into being is 
reflective of both its embeddedness in a complex, historically evolved political 
economy that was historically skeptical with regard to private law making and market 
ordering170 and a fast-evolving transnational regulatory landscape in which public and 
private actors – as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ not only compete in striving to make ‘better 
rules’ but in a much richer fashion overlap, intertwine, collaborate and antagonize, 
thereby contributing to a constantly changing space that Saskia Sassen has referred to as 
both institutional and normative. 
The concept of Rough Consensus and Running Code seeks to capture the particular 
tension between multipolar, formal/informal processes of deliberation and consensus-
seeking on the one hand and the emergence of regulatory instruments with experimental 
and adaptable character on the other. Central to this approach is the emphasis on the 
inseparability of elementary features in theories of social order, which are traditionally 
defined through distinctions. Examples include, foremost, the distinction between 
public and private or between state and market, but also – as regards the ‘function’ of a 
norm, between coordination and regulation.171 The RCRC model seeks to capture the 
particular tension inherent to norm generating processes where the nature of the 
particular issue does not easily lend itself to an association with only one of these 
elements. The evolving norms and the processes of their generation in sensitive 
regulatory areas defy a categorization of either public or private, coordinative or 
                                                 
170  See Hans Großmann-Doerth, 'Selbstgeschaffenes Recht der Wirtschaft und staatliches Recht [1933]' in U Blau-
rock, N Goldschmidt and A Hollerbach (eds), Das selbstgeschaffene Recht der Wirtschaft Zum Gedenken an 
Hans Großmann-Doerth (1894-1944) (Mohr Siebeck, 2005); Dieter Hart, 'Zur konzeptionellen Entwicklung des 
Vertragsrechts' (1984) 29 Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 66. 
171  See Gillian Hadfield, 'The Public and the Private in the Provision of Law for Global Services' in V Gessner (ed) 
Contractual Certainty in International Trade Empirical Studies and Theoretical Debates on Institutional Support 
for Global Economic Exchanges (Hart Publishing, 2009). 
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regulative. As a result, their classification as either ‘law’ or ‘non-law’ depending on 
their origin in a recognized, competent law-making authority is as problematic as is the 
declaration that a norm constitutes a merely ‘private’ arrangement or, ‘social norm’. 
RCRC, thus, problematizes the tension between the definition of a norm’s legitimacy as 
law or non-law with reference to whether or not it emanated from an ‘official’ law-
making authority on the one hand and as to whether the legitimacy of norms should be 
measured in light of the input into their creation by those ‘affected’ by the norm, on the 
other. As we have tried to show with regard to a number of fast-evolving regulatory 
areas in both contract and corporate law, the particular dynamics of norm-creation in 
sensitive societal areas characterized by a hybrid combination of official and inofficial 
actors and a high degree of experimental, tentative, reflexive regulation, suggest the 
impossibility to associate such processes with only one of the identified sides. 
From this perspective, the transnational regulatory landscape of corporate 
governance is marked by the intricate collision of public, private and hybrid, ceaselessly 
evolving norm making processes that arise between regulatory arenas populated by 
actors inside and outside of the nation state. These norm making processes are complex 
in the sense that the identification of either coordinative (facilitating) or regulatory 
(redistributing) functions can no longer occur on the basis of distinguising between the 
public or private nature of the actors involved. Instead, the norm making processes have 
to be seen as law generating when and where we are willing to recognize the 
inseparability of the coordinative/regulatory dimension from the authority/affectedness 
dimension of these processes.  
Against this background, what can be learned from this example for other 
contemporary forms of law making? Recognizing a growing interest among legal 
scholars in the origins and prospects of what is conventionally referred to as a 
‘privatisation of law’172, it is necessary to emphasize that the regulatory function of the 
Code does not follow from the state’s enactment of a statutory disclosure obligation, as 
was repeatedly argued by those identifying the Code as a public regulatory instrument. 
What constitutes an unsatisfactory answer to the question whether or not the Code is 
law, resulted from the recognition that in fact not only the underlying drafting process 
but also the envisioned enforcement mechanism are intriguingly complex and arguably 
open-ended for a reason. The government did not make the Code directly or indirectly 
enforceable, when it enacted the disclosure requirement, as it did not itself enact an 
ultimately effective sanctioning mechanism for the case of non-disclosure or deficient 
                                                 
172  Johannes Köndgen, 'Privatisierung des Rechts. Private Governance zwischen Deregulierung und Rekonstitutio-
nalisierung' (2006) 206 Archiv für die cilivilistische Praxis [AcP] 477; Georg Borges, 'Selbstregulierung im Ge-
sellschaftsrecht - zur Bindung an Corporate Governance-Kodices' (2003) 32 ZGR 508. 
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disclosure. Instead, the government’s action in this regard illustrates a particular set of 
features that characterize law making in the area of corporate governance and many 
other regulatory areas today. The Code can only fulfil its function of influencing 
corporate behavior and, as such, rendering German corporations more competitive, if a 
sufficient number of market participants endorse the Code’s rules to make them matter. 
In that sense, a rough consensus regarding the Code’s normative obligations must exist 
for it to have any influence on the corporate landscape. This rough consensus must not 
encompass each and every of the Code’s recommendations or, perhaps even lesser, its 
suggestions. Instead, it suffices that there is among market participants a far reaching 
agreement – a rough consensus – as to the binding quality of the Code’s content. That 
this is the case, has been verified by a number of empirical studies since its 
publication.173 Secondly, the particular quality of the Code’s three-pronged regulatory 
nature of information (restatements), recommendations and suggestions in connection 
with the statutory disclosure requirements for recommendations leads to a complex 
constellation of the Code’s regulatory impact. Where a rough consensus is being 
attained, it might set into motion the generation and crystallisation of a customary law 
of corporate governance norms, namely with the passage of time and an increasing 
acceptance of the Code among market participants. With the crystallisation of certain 
corporate governance rules, parts of the law of corporate governance can develop into a 
regime which can further develop and solidify in the future. In light of such an 
incremental growth of norms through piloting (drafting a code), implementing 
(publishing it) and enforcing them (through a communication obligation set by the state 
on the one hand, and a market shaming process on the other), the Code can contribute to 
the growth of a corporate governance regime, which can become ever more 
comprehensive, while at the same time being more flexible, open and adaptive to 
changes than a statutory provision would be.  
Seen in this light, the Code is illustrative of how recommendations can be made to 
enter a regulatory realm, which is occupied by both public and private norm-
entrepreneurs, including the state that is pursuing corporate law reform, and private 
actors such as banks, investments funds and expert groups who are calling for new rules 
governing corporate conduct but also other stakeholders such as unions and business 
ethics propagators. From this perspective, the Code denotes how recommendations can 
                                                 
173  Axel von Werder, Till Talaulicar and Georg L. Kolat, 'Kodex Report 2003: Die Akzeptanz der Empfehlungen des 
Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex' (2003) 56 Der Betrieb 1857; Peter Oser, Christian Orth and Dominic 
Wader, 'Die Umsetzung des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex in der Praxis' (2003) 56 DB 1337; Jürgen 
van Kann and Mira Eigler, 'Aktuelle Neuerungen des Corporate Governance Kodex' (2007) Deutsche Zeitschrift 
für Steuerrecht 1730. 
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increasingly be recognised as ‘rules to be followed’, long before they may grow into 
widely accepted norms of ‘good governance’. That the latter is not oriented towards a 
reductionist concept of market efficiency, is maintained by connecting the 
coordinative/regulatory dimension with that of authority/affectedness. It is against this 
background, then, that we need to not only return again to the original question of 
whether the Code is law, but also to dare asking whether we have been asking the right 
question. 
As suggested, the perspective taken vis-à-vis reform issues related to corporate 
governance has been informed by both a public-private, official-non-official distinction 
between law and non-law on the one hand and a deeply felt skepticism about the 
chances for the law reform of historically grown, path-dependent norms and institutions, 
not only in ‘Germany Incorporated’174, on the other. And, indeed, the legacies with 
which we have been struggling, are weighty. In contrast to the the institutional and 
methodological side of norm setting and law making in the context of increasingly 
‘privatised’ law making forms, most contemporary commentators of corporate law 
reform have not yet begun to embrace such a perspective. As it stands, law reform 
continues to be conceptualised largely with regard to a dualistic perception of state 
regulation and ‘intervention’ on the one hand and market order and self-regulation on 
the other. Traditionally, the German choice was thus: ‘To regulate or not to regulate’. 
And, the traditional answer was, indeed, to regulate.175 The realm of options for the 
protection of shareholders’ interests have thus been perceived to range from coercive, 
                                                 
174  Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, 'An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism' in PA Hall and D Soskice (eds), 
Varieties of Capitalism The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, 
2001). 
175  See, hereto the brillant account by Gerald Spindler, 'Deregulierung des Aktienrechts?' (1998) 43 Die 
Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 53, 53 ff., 57, stressing the different approach taken by American corporate law, which - 
for the most part - is state law, which is, in turn, ‘enabling’ law, giving firms great discretion in designing their 
governing law. ‘Corporate law’ as such, then, serves for one as framework providing default rules, while it does, 
on federal level, contain a considerable number of binding rules pertaining to safeguard investors’s interest and 
the trust in the capital market; Peter Ulmer, 'Der deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex - ein neues 
Regulierungsinstrument für börsennotierte Aktiengesellschaften' (2002) 166 ZHR 150, 178 f., contemplating the 
code’s allegedly meager achievements as to further de-regulate corporate law; but see Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
'Pathways to Corporate Governance ? Two Steps on the Road to Shareholder Capitalism in Germany' (1999) 5 
Columbia Journal of European Law 219, see also, Werner F. Ebke, 'Die Zukunft der Rechtsetzung in 
multijurisdiktionalen Rechtsordnungen: Wettbewerb der Rechtsordnungen oder zentrale Regelungsvorgabe - am 
Beispiel des Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrechts' in CJ Meier-Schatz (ed) Die Zukunft des Rechts (Helbing & 
Lichtenhahn, 1998), 109-112. 
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binding law (‘vested rights’) to an approach of entrusting this protection to the capital 
market. In the latter extreme, the shareholder’s position as that of a rightsholder in a 
corporation would basically be seen as a tradable asset, the value of which would be 
determined by the market, not by ‘the law’.176 There is, certainly, much more to be said 
to this set of alternatives, and the dramatic substitution of post-Enron corporate 
governance reform177 by an overwhelming task to come to terms with the current 
financial and economic crisis underscores the dimensions of the task faced. 
But it is against this background that - on both sides of the Atlantic - the search for 
‘good governance’ in company law will continue. It will do so by involving the wide 
range of public, private and hybrid law making forms which we have increasingly 
grown accustomed to. For this, valuable lessons can be drawn from earlier examples of 
commercial self-regulation (e.g. standard contracts), as well as from other, 
contemporary developments in other fields (environmental law, commercial 
arbitration178). The rich spectrum of experiences on the national, European and 
international level is reflective of an on-going search for ways to adequately mobilise 
societal knowledge while being aware and conscious of divergent national trajectories 
of socio-legal and economic development. The enactment of the Corporate Governance 
Code and the installation and indeed highly effective continuation of a ‘standing 
commission’ to review its acceptance and the need of amendments are both illustrations 
of a change in approaching law reform in a politically highly contested area. At the 
same time, the development of codes, in Germany as in many other countries around the 
world, by private and public actors, both domestically and transnationally, gives 
testimony of an emerging legal regime that can no longer adequately be relegated to 
either a state or market realm. Instead, the emerging regime of a transnational law of 
corporate governance is characterised by its ‘spatial’ character, both with regard to its 
normative scope and its institutional origin. 
                                                 
176  Gerald Spindler, 'Deregulierung des Aktienrechts?' (1998) 43 Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 53, at 59. 
177  Interestingly, commentators were quick to point out the futility of premature European trimphancy with regard to 
the events in corporate America at the time of Enron and WorldCom’s collapse: see, The Economist, 13 July 
2002, 54, denouncing any pride in ‘Europe’s gentle form of Capitalism’ in light (or shadow, for that matter) of 
highly disputable governmental interventions at the side of falling corporate giants. 
178  See, hereto Filip De Ly, 'Lex Mercatoria (New Law Merchant): Globalisation and International Self-Regulation' 
in V Gessner, RP Appelbaum and WF Felstiner (eds), Rules and Networks The Legal Culture of Global Business 
Transactions (Hart Publishing, 2001), 159 ff.; Peer Zumbansen, 'Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial Arbitration 
and Transnational Law' (2002) 8 European Law Journal 400. 
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As corporate governance scholarship continues to sharpen its lens for deeper struc-
tures of formal/informal norm-creation and the particular socio-economic cultures179 in 
which different hybrid regulatory approaches emerge, it becomes evident to which de-
gree ‘comparative corporate governance’180 is being transformed into a inter-disciplinary 
area of regulatory analysis. Our focus on the way in which corporate governance princi-
ples are migrating in between different national political economies on the one hand and 
emerging, constantly reshaping regulatory spaces, for which Marc Amstutz has poign-
antly used the term of ‘interlegality’181, on the other, informs and accentuates our per-
ceptions not only for the existing differences in national corporate laws, but more im-
portantly for the fact that conventionally viewed ‘national corporate governance sys-
tems’ have long become transnationally constituted spaces of institutional and norma-
tive interaction and contestation. They are, thus, anything than peaceful, embedded legal 
orders. Instead, they are marked by a fundamental regulatory transformation in which 
social norms and ‘soft law’ become intertwined, changed, adapted and interwoven 
within a regulatory environment which itself is no longer stable. 
The case of corporate governance reform, which we studied in this paper, illustrates 
the degree to which the contested issues and the successively made proposals that grew 
out of a far-reaching and open-eyed gathering of information and evidence by national 
and supra-national policy makers, expert committees and scholars were of a veritable 
transnational nature, emerging from parallel reform efforts in other countries, among 
private and non-state actors around the world. In that sense182, domestic company law 
reform must be seen as part of an emerging transnational legal pluralism. Its defining 
feature is the fundamental contestation of the very distinction that legal pluralism has 
always struggled with: that between law and non-law. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Corporate governance norms provide a telling example of the transformation of tradi-
tional state-originating, official norm-setting in favour of increasingly de-centralised, 
                                                 
179  See only Amir N. Licht, 'The Mother of all Path-Dependencies: Towards a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate 
Governance Systems' (2001) 26 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 147. 
180  Mark J. Roe, 'Comparative corporate governance' in P Newman (ed) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 
and the Law (Palgrave Macmillan, 1998) 
181  Marc Amstutz, 'In-Between Worlds: Marleasing and the Emergence of Interlegality in Legal Reasoning' (2005) 
11 European Law Journal 766; see also Marc Amstutz and Vagias Karavas, 'Rechtsmutation: Zu Genese und 
Evolution des Rechts im transnationalen Raum' (2006) Rechtshistorisches Journal 14. 
182  Referring to examples of transnational human rights litigation, see hereto Robert Wai, 'Transnational Private Law 
and Private Ordering in Contested Global Society' (2005) 46 Harvard International Law Journal 471, 475-476. 
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multi-level processes of norm production. At the same time, not only are norms pro-
duced on more levels; the nature of these norms themselves changes dramatically. What 
the foregoing assessment of the present trajectories of transnational corporate govern-
ance (including the case study of Germany’s efforts as regards corporate governance 
reform) illuminated is the particular nature of the regulation of business conduct and 
corporations in globally interdependent activity spheres (marketisation), fundamentally 
changing national political economies (privatisation) and a dramatic expansion of issue-
driven, functionalist regulatory regimes (scientisation).183 This constellation, however, 
suggests nothing less than a fundamental contestation and erosion of boundaries be-
tween state and non-state actors, between official and unofficial law, between public 
and private ordering.184 What is important at this point is to repeat the observation made 
earlier, that the novelty of this blurring of boundaries between traditional norm-creating 
and –executing spheres appears as a direct result of a specific historical experience of a 
particular framework of socio-economic, political-legal regulation that characterised the 
20th rise of the Social and Welfare State.185 This experience has been aptly identified and 
premeditated by turn-of-the-century sociologists and lawyers, and powerfully captured 
by Max Weber’s sobering assessment of the disenchantment of modernity.186 Irre-
                                                 
183  For an excellent demarcation of these dimensions, see Gili S. Drori and John W. Meyer, 'Scientization: Making a 
World safe for organizing' in M-L Djelic and K Sahlin-Andersson (eds), Transnational Governance Institutional 
Dynamics of Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
184  See e.g. Volkmar Gessner, Richard P. Appelbaum and William F. Felstiner, 'Introduction: The Legal Culture of 
Global Business Transactions' in V Gessner, RP Appelbaum and WF Felstiner (eds), Rules and Networks: The 
Legal Culture of Global Business Transactions (Hart Publishing, 2001); Francis Snyder, Economic Globalisation 
and the Law in the 21st Century, in: The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society (2003); Katharina Pistor, 'Of 
Legal Transplants, Legal Irritants, and Economic Development' in P Cornelius and B Kogut (eds), Corporate 
Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy (Oxford University Press, 2003). 
185  Niklas Luhmann, Political Theory in the Welfare State [1981, transl. by John Bednarz Jr.] (Walter de Gruyter, 
1990); Michael Stolleis, 'Die Entstehung des Interventionsstaates und das öffentliche Recht' (1989) 11 ZNR 129. 
186  Max Weber, The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904/05, Talcott Parsons transl.) (Charles Scrib-
ner's Sons, 1930); Max Weber, On Law in Economy and Society (transl. from the German Wirtschaft und Gesell-
schaft, 2nd ed., 1925, by E.Shils and M.Rheinstein, edited/annotated by M.Rheinstein) (Simon Schuster, 1967); 
David Trubek, 'Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism' (1972) Wisconsin Law Review 720; Rudolf 
Wiethölter, 'Proceduralization of the Category of Law' in C Joerges and D Trubek (eds), Critical Legal Thought: 
An American-German Debate (Nomos, 1985); Gunther Teubner, 'Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern 
Law' (1983) 17 Law & Society Review 239; Gralf-Peter Calliess, Prozedurales Recht (Nomos, 1999); Peer Zum-
bansen, Ordnungsmuster im modernen Wohlfahrtsstaat. Lernerfahrungen zwischen Staat, Gesellschaft und Ver-
trag (Nomos, 2000). 
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deemably thrown into the iron cage of modern rationalisation187, contemporary hopes 
are pinned – if at all – on a transformative realisation of emerging self-regulatory poten-
tials.188 It is against this narrative, that I see current attempts to rethink legal regulation 
as ‘regulatory governance’, ‘regulatory capitalism’, or ‘rough consensus and running 
code’. 
The framework of transnational corporate governance regulation can only be under-
stood against the background and in light of the complex, intertwined nature of corpo-
rate governance regulation as it unfolds in a context marked by tensions between na-
tional and, for example, European aspirations for market competitiveness, market and 
polity integration dynamics and the increasingly transnational nature of firm’s opera-
tions and regulations. A viable theory of transnational law making must seek to ac-
knowledge these contextual tensions and acknowledge the various learning experiences 
with regard to market regulation in order to productively integrate them into an enriched 
concept of regulatory governance. Such a theory might then be able to capture the par-
ticular dynamics of transnational corporate governance regulation through its structur-
ing capacities of distinguishing between the substantive and procedural dimensions of 
contemporary norm-creation. The particular promise of a theory such as RCRC here lies 
in its capacity to draw conceptual lines between the experimentation with norm-creating 
processes, which are understood as contextualised learning processes (‘rough consen-
sus’) on the one hand, and the assessment of emerging normative bodies on the other 
(‘running code’). The promise of RCRC lies in its sensitivity with regard to knowledge 
emanating from concrete regulatory contexts that are recognized as norm proposals. 
Within the process of disseminating such norm proposals, they are gradually evolving 
into programs of regulation. Emerging into a still evolving running code, such norm 
programs remain fully assessable from any factual or normative standpoint, while not 
sacrificing their ongoing regulatory function. As such, this model strives – not unlike 
competing governance concepts – for coherence, applicability and, ultimately, legiti-
macy.  
                                                 
187  Richard Sennett, The Culture of the New Capitalism (Yale University Press, 2006). 
188  Jean Cohen and Charles F. Sabel, 'Directly-deliberative polyarchy' (1997) 3 European Law Journal 313; Oliver 
Gerstenberg, 'Law´s Polyarchy: A Comment on Cohen and Sabel' (1997) 3 European Law Journal 343. 
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